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SMITH, LYONS ESSAY PRIZE

The Development of an International Patent Regime:
Sound Legal Theory or Misguided Leap of Faith?

Graham Flack*
Proposals for the establishment of an international patent regime have occupied the
attention of negotiators during the Uruguay Round of the GAIT. While considerable
resources have been devoted to determining the details of such a regime, little attention
has been focussed on the justifications for such a system. The analysis of the
philosophical, economic, and political justifications for the establishment of an
international patent regime concludes that all current philosophical justifications rely on
perceived normative economic benefits. In addition, the economic benefits of
international patent protection cannot be assessed on the basis of existing economic data.
The push for international patent protection is the result of the blind application of
political and economic power by industrialized countries, and not a rational
determination of national or global interests.
Les propositions pour l'etablissement d'un regime international de brevets Ont occupe
!'attention des negociateurs pendant "l'Uruguay Round" du GAIT. Quoique
enormement de ressources aient ete consacrees a la determination des details du regime,
peu d'attention a ete portee aux justifications de creation d'un tel regime. l'analyse des
justifications philosophiques, economiques, et politiques pour l 'etablissement d 'un
regime de brevet international conclut que toutes les justifications philosophiques
presentes sont basees sur des avantages normatifs economiques per9us. De plus, !es
avantages economiques d'une protection internationale de brevet ne peuvent pas etre
estimes apartir des donnees qui existent presentement. l'initiative pour une protection
internationale de brevet est le resultat de !'application aveugle de pouvoirs politiques et
economiques par les pays industrialises, et non pas une determination rationelle des
interets nationaux ou globaux.
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"You see," he went on after a pause, "it's as well to be provided for
everything. That's the reason the horse has all those anklets round his

feet."
"But what are they for?" Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity.
"To guard against the bite of sharks," the Knight replied. "It's an
invention of my own."
- The White Knight and Alice in Through the looking Glass. 1

Law is a system of rules recognized by a community as binding. It is designed
to serve the interests of the community, not to determine those interests. This is
particularly true for international law where the sovereignty of nation-states
permits the opting out of all but a select few peremptory norms. 2 Thus, in
determining whether efforts should be made to establish an international patent
system, it is critical that the interests of each of the participating communities be
examined. In Alice's terms, the question is whether we need international patent
protection to foster the optimal level of shark protection for horses.
This paper will focus on the philosophical, economic, and political
underpinnings that should and will determine whether or not an international
patent system is established. While detailed reference will be made to existing
legal instruments and perceived difficulties with them, the paper will not focus
on a clause-by-clause analysis of possible technical modifications to the existing
legal regime that might create a more efficient of body law. The international
patent system, despite its relatively long history, is at a stage where the members
of the community cannot agree whether there should be a system of rules at all,
let alone what the most efficient way of setting out those rules would be. As a
result, it is critical that the underlying philosophical, economic, and political
bases of an international patent system be examined.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first consists of a brief
discussion of what patents are and what is meant by the establishment of an
international patent system. The second reviews in detail the existing
multilateral patent instruments including the perceived difficulties with those
instruments. The third examines the philosophical bases of both utilitarian and
rights theories in justifying a domestic or international patent system. In the
fourth, the economic costs and benefits of an international patent system,
including transfer costs, are broken down in an effort to determine if economics

1 Lewis

Carroll, Little Alice Edition (London: MacMillan, 1988) at 149.
These norms superseding the authority of domestic legislatures have been severely
limited in interpretations by the International Court of Justice. See generally H. Kindred
et al., International law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 4th ed., (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 1987); S.S. lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927), Ser. A. Vol. 2, No. 9,
I, at 18-30; Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (1969), I.L.M. 679, Arts 53, 64.
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provides us with a normative decision on the establishment of an international
patent system. Finally, the political underpinnings of domestic patent systems
are examined in an effort to determine whether international political realities
are likely to ensure the establishment of an international patent system,
regardless of arguments for or against such a system.
I intend to demonstrate that current dissatisfaction with the international
patent regime is likely to result in the establishment of an international patent
system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in spite of
the fact that there is insufficient economic data with which to judge the
efficiency of such a system. Consequently, rather than focussing their resources
on negotiating detailed terms of a potential GA TT agreement, the legal
community should be fostering research in an effort to determine whether there
are sound philosophical or economic bases on which to support or reject the
establishment of an international patent regime.

THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT
Patents and inventors' certificates are the two forms of industrial property rights
that have the common goal of fostering economic development through the
encouragement of invention. Inventors' certificates provide a financial reward
to the inventor in return for which the state obtains all rights to the invention.
Although inventors' certificates were commonly used in Marxist societies,
including China and the Soviet Union, the remarkable economic transformation
in Marxist states led by Deng Xiaoping's reforms of China has resulted for the
most part in the abandonment of inventors' certificates in favour of patents. 3
Consequently, this paper focusses on patents as the most accepted means
through which industrial property rights are protected. 4
The World Intellectual Property Organization defines a patent as:
A legally enforceable right granted by virtue of a law to a
person to exclude, for a limited time, others from certain acts
in relation to a described new invention; the privilege is
granted by a government authority as a matter of right to the

See W.E. Beaumont, "The New Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC):
Evidence of a Second 'Renaissance'?" (1986), 27 Idea 39; and D. B. Kay, "The Patent
Law of the People's Republic of China in Perspective," (1985), 33 U.C.L.A. L.R. 331 for
an account of the remarkable transformation in intellectual property protection in China
with the introduction of the 1984 Patent Law.
4 The Economics section of this paper will show that patents are not the only vehicle, nor
are they necessarily the most efficient means, by which a societal goal of increased
innovation can be met.
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person who is entitled to apply for it and who fulfils the
prescribed conditions." 5

In short, a patent grants a bundle of rights for inventions that meet certain tests.
Both the rights and tests applied vary among the patent systems of different
states. The rights granted to inventors range from sixteen to twenty years of
monopoly protection in most industrialized countries to no protection in
Afghanistan. 6 The tests for patentability of a product also differ from country to
country, but three broad tests are generally used. The first is that the invention
be new. Inventors will not be rewarded with a patent for technology that is
already in use or has been patented by someone else, even if they arrived at their
invention without knowing of its existence. The second test is that the invention
must be non-obvious. Even if the product is new, it will not be eligible for a
patent if the invention would be obvious to a person skilled in the field in which
the invention was made. The final test is that the invention be applicable in
industry.
In discussing the establishment of an international patent system, it would
be easy to fall into the lawyer's trap of drafting appropriate provisions for patent
rights and criteria through a comparison of existing domestic patent systems.
However, as has already been noted, if this international patent law is to be
reflective of the interests of the international community, it must be based on
sound philosophical, economic, and political underpinnings. In order to provide
a framework for discussion of these underpinnings, this paper examines the
current push by industrialized countries for a harmonized international patent
system that would establish minimum standards, both in terms of the scope of
patent protection and in the duration of patent rights. Before examining the
merits of such a system, existing international patent mechanisms and the
pressures to reform them will be outlined.
THE EXISTING MULTILATERAL PATENT INSTRUMENTS
The Paris Convention

Multilateral cooperation in the field of patent protection began in 1883 with
fourteen nations signing the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention). The Convention protects a full range of
intellectual property, including patents, utility models, industrial designs, and

5

Quoted in United Nations, The role of the patent system in the transfer of technology to
developing countries UNCTAD, 1975, UN DOC TD/B/398 [hereinafter The role of the
patent system.]
6 Ibid. at 54.
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trademarks. The treaty remains the dominant international document in the field
of patent protection and its paramountcy has only come to be challenged in the
last two decades. 7 Since 1967, the Paris Convention has been administered
through the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which is one of 15
specialized agencies of the United Nations. 8 By the beginning of 1990, the Paris
Convention had 100 member states, with two-thirds of those states being
developing countries. 9
The Convention has been revised on six occasions 10 and its key components
with respect to patents can be divided into seven major areas. They are: equality
of treatment, right of priority, independence of patent systems, right to import
patented articles, compulsory licensing and revocation, right to special
agreements, and enforcement.
The pillar of the Convention is its guarantee of equality of treatment. 11 This
clause requires member states to treat foreign and domestic patent applications
in the same way and accord them the same rights. While individual countries
are free to determine their own criteria and levels of patent protection, they must
accord the same level of protection to foreigners and nationals.
The second element of the Convention is the right of priority. 12 This gives
the inventor a priority right of twelve months to file for protection in all member
countries after having filed in one member country. This provision is designed
to ensure that filing for protection in one country cannot be deemed to be
publication for the purposes of determining whether or not protection may be
obtained in other member countries.
The third element of the Convention is the general right of each member
state to maintain its own patent system. 13 This allows member states to set their
own standards for determining the criteria to be met for patent protection,
whether any products or processes may be excluded entirely from protection,
and the duration of patent protection.
The fourth element of the Convention is protection against measures to
As shall be argued later, perceptions in some industrialized countries that the Paris
Convention insufficiently protects patents has shifted the focus of international patent

7

protection toward the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).
8 A concise overview of the activities of WIPO can be found in WIPO: General
Information (Geneva, United Nations, 1989).
9 M. A. Leaffer, ed., International Treaties on Intellectual Property (Washington: BNA,
1990) at 19.
10 The most recent of these was the Stockholm revision of 1967.
11 See Article 2(1 ).
12 See Article 4(A)(I).
13 See Article 4bis(I).
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prevent the importation of patented articles. 14 This precludes member states
from forfeiting a patent on the basis that the invention is being imported into the
country. The article was designed to prevent member states from utilizing
patent requirements as a non-tariff barrier that would force the production of
each patented item in the country granting the patent.
The fifth area of the Convention places limitations on the use of revocation
and compulsory licensing in member states. 15 While there is a general freedom
of states to control their patent system under article 4(1), they are prevented
from granting compulsory licences until at least three years after the grant of the
patent. Revocation is not permitted until at least two years after the granting of
the first compulsory licence.
The sixth major element of the Convention is found in article 19 which
permits member states to enter into special agreements outside the Convention. 16
The only restriction on these agreements is that they not contravene the
provisions of the Convention. Examples of such special agreements are the
Patent Cooperation Treaty and the European Patent Convention.
The final key element of the convention is the dispute resolution section. 17
The preferred settlement mechanism is negotiation, but members have recourse
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if negotiation fails. This procedure
requires the consent of both parties before an action can be brought before the
ICJ and there is no effective enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with
ICJ rulings. 18
Criticisms of the Paris Convention
Despite the longevity of the Convention, it has come under increasing attack
from both developed and developing countries. The critique of developing

14

See Article 5(A)(l).
See Article 5(A)(2).
See Article 19.
17 See Article 28(1).
18 The only real weapon at the disposal of an aggrieved country is to deny the other
country patent protection. This crude weapon may not be effective if the aggrieved
country is dependant on the other country as a market. For example, it can be argued that
the United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 is in violation of the
Convention as it only grants protection in the United States to nationals of foreign
countries that provide comparable protection to American nationals. This would violate
Article 2 of the Convention governing national treatment. Still, 18 countries have
enacted reciprocal legislation in order to meet the American demand. None has taken
action under the Paris Convention against the United States. See R. M. Gadbaw,
"Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or Marriage of Convenience?"
(1989) 22 Vand. J. ofTransnat'l L. 223 at 234-239.
15
16
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nations has centred on the general intent of the Convention and a perceived lack
of specific measures to deal with the problems of industrial development faced
by technology-poor countries. The critique from the developed world has
stemmed from the perceived ineffectiveness of the Paris Convention in securing
the protection of intellectual property rights, including patent protection.
Attack from the Developing World
Although two thirds of the Convention members are developing countries,
they have had little influence in determining the terms of the treaty. Many
developing countries were not in a position to influence the last of the
Convention revisions in 1967 as they had only recently gained their
independence from colonial powers.
The holistic criticism made by many developing nations is that the
Convention is directed toward reward of the inventor and not to the technology
transfer and development needs of developing nations. The Committee on
Transfer of Technology of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development describes Article I of the Convention as follows:
It is in fact a charter of rights for patent holders, its essential

concern being to determine and safeguard their privileges. As
contrasted with the detail and precision with which their
privileges are stated, there is little about the rights of the States
which grant these privileges. There is little recognition of the
public interest that is expected to be served by the system of
patents and few provisions about the remedial measures to
deal with possible abuses of the system. 19
The Committee recommended a revision in the philosophy of the Convention
that would enable developing countries to place technological and industrial
needs ahead of inventor rights. 20
In order to effect this philosophical shift, the Committee recommends
changes to specific provisions of the Convention. Not surprisingly, the major
shift is in the principle of national treatment. The Committee argues that this
principle "merely protects the rights of foreign patent holders so far as the
developing countries are concerned, and can be characterized as a reverse
system of preferences in the markets of developing countries for foreign patent

19 Committee on Transfer of Technology, The International Patent System: The Revision
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, UN CTAD, 1977,
UNDOC TD/B/c.6/AC. 312 at 4.
20
Ibid. at 7.
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holders." 21 Given the technological advantage of developed countries over
developing countries, it is argued that national treatment ensures that local
inventors in developing countries would be overwhelmed by foreign inventors
while having virtually no chance at having a product patented in a developed
country. 22 In order to avoid the national treatment requirement, some developing
nations such as India have refused to participate in the Paris Convention.
The Committee argues that developing countries should be free to designate
certain sectors with a local novelty requirement that would grant patents only
where the invention was adapted to local conditions. 23 This type of patent would
only be available to nationals of the developing country to encourage the
application of foreign technology to their particular needs. Such a provision in
national patent legislation would leave the country in violation of the national
treatment rule of the currently constituted Paris Convention.
A second suggested change to specific convention provisions concerns
Article 5(A)(4) of the Convention governing compulsory licensing. The
Committee states "the compulsory licensing procedure [of the Paris Convention]
has proved in practice of virtually no value whatsoever." 24 Developing nations
argue that the article gives inventors an abusive monopoly for three years after
the grant of the patent. Examples of abusive practices include the failure to
work an invention in the developing country with the expressed intention of
preventing it from competing with an existing product or the sale of a quantity of
the invention well below demand to drive up the price. The failure to work is of
particular concern to developing countries given that estimates of the percentage
of patents not worked run as high as 95 percent. 25
The third major change suggested to the Convention concerns article
5(A)(l) which prevents forfeiture of the patent on the grounds that the patented
item is being imported into the country. The Committee argues that developing
countries should be free to demand local production of the patented item, at least
21

Ibid. at 25.

22

This would appear to be borne out by findings of the United Nations (see The role of
the patent system, supra note 5). It was found that nationals of developing countries own
16 percent of patents in their own country and 1 percent of the world stock of patents.

Both the relative deficiency in technological infrastructure and the lack of capital
available to test inventions in developing countries are seen as contributing to the
inability of the developing country inventor to compete with the developed country
inventor. See ibid. at 41-42.
23 Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 25.
24
Ibid. at I 0.
25 Differences in figures stem from the difficulty in obtaining accurate figures of what
inventions are and are not worked in a specific country. The 95 percent figure is arrived
at by Shlomo Cohen using United Nations data in "Compulsory Licensing of Patents The Paris Convention Model," (1979) 20 Idea 153 at 186.
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in those sectors where the national economy can support such production. 26
After being presented with the findings of the Transfer of Technology
Committee, developing nations began a concerted push to alter the Paris
Convention in the March 1980 Geneva meetings of the Convention members.
They called for a reexamination of the convention in light of the role of the
patent system in the transfer of technology to developing countries. 27 To date,
their efforts have been unsuccessful.
Attack from the Developed World
While developing nations have expressed concern about excessive
restrictions in the Paris Convention as currently constituted, developed nations
have complained about its lack of effectiveness. Two approaches have been
utilized by developed countries to achieve their goals. The first was the
multilateral approach adopted through the acceptance of a model law for
invention in 1970. The second has been the unilateral approach of the United
States since the early 1970s, which is largely a response to the perceived
ineffectiveness of the multilateral approach. Both approaches attempt to secure
a minimum level of patent protection for all countries.
The multilateral approach began in 1963 with discussions at the United
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPl) 28 for
the development of a model law for inventions in developing countries. The
model law contained four principles supporting the acceptance of a minimum
patent protection period: the first was that inventor disclosure is preferable to the
maintenance of trade secrets; the second was that a patent system encourages
research and invention; the third was that it would attract investor capital; and
the fourth was that it would provide a self-regulating means of rewarding
inventors. 29
The model law argues for the adoption of a 16-20 year patent protection
period, stating that "[t]here would be no particular advantage in developing
countries in having a shorter period. It would adversely affect local patentees, or

Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 16.
H. P. Kunz-Hallstein, "The United States Proposal for a GATT Agreement on
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,"
(1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'I L. 265 at 265.
28 BIRPI was the predecessor to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
29 UNCTAD, Restrictive business practices: An analysis of the World Intellectual

26

27

Property Organization model laws for the developing countries from the point of view of
the export interests of the developing countries, UNCTAD, 1972, UN DOC. TD/B/398 at
5 [hereinafter Restrictive Business Practices].
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local licensees of patent rights originating abroad." 30 The obvious bias of this
model law toward developed countries has been highlighted by later United
Nations studies critical of it. A 1972 U.N. study noted that "the model on
inventions is based on the patent system as generally accepted in very many
developed countries of the world for the protection and exploitation of new
inventions." 31 Perhaps not surprisingly, many developing countries refused to
adopt the legislation or did so with considerable exceptions as to products that
were covered by patents. 32
Partly as a result of the ineffectiveness of the voluntary model law on
inventions and partly in response to protectionist domestic trade pressures, in
1974 the United States embarked on a unilateral program of protection of
American intellectual property rights abroad. The American ideal can be seen in
the comments of American patent lawyer Charles A. Hunnicutt at a forum
discussing the intellectual property implications of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. Hunnicutt
states:
A reality I think we tend to lose sight of in our current
movement to protect intellectual property is that intellectual
property costs money; it costs government resources and it
costs private sector resources in terms of the costs of multiple
searches and registrations as well as enforcement. These costs
would be significantly reduced if registration for intellectual
property were available through one application, in the
applicant's language, for the issuance of one patent, or
trademark, or one copyright world-wide. 33
Implicit in Hunnicutt's paradigm is that the one level of universal patent
protection is closer to the American standard of protection than that of India.
Unlike the developing countries, which lack the economic and political
clout to unilaterally effect significant changes in the patent system, the United
States has been able to take national measures that have enforced certain
minimum levels of compliance from other countries. This has been
accomplished through successive strengthening of the United States Trade Act
as a tool for enforcing American trade goals.
Ibid. at 9.
Ibid. at 5.
32 The United Nations Report on the role of patent system in technology transfer provides
a list of areas commonly excluded from patent protection including food and
pharmaceutical products as well as the countries that exclude them from protection. See
supra note 5, at 53.
33 C.A. Hunnicutt, "The Trade Act of 1988 and the MTNs: Long-Term Planning and
Reform," (1989) 19 Ga. J. Int'! and Comp. L. 296 at 302.
30
31
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Intellectual property first became a target of American trade legislation with
the adoption of the 1974 Trade Act34 that authorized the executive branch to
negotiate a reduction in barriers to trade in services while providing American
exporters of services with recourse against unfair trade practices. Congressional
dissatisfaction with presidential utilization of this weapon led to the passage of
the 1984 Trade Act35 which required the President to take into account the
protection a foreign nation affords to intellectual property rights when
determining that country's eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences
and whether actions of the country should be considered unreasonable for
purposes of section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. 36
The unilateral approach has met with considerable success among countries
that rely heavily on the United States for trade. South Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore all made substantive revisions to their patent systems in response to
threatened use of the section 301 provisions of the 1974 Trade Act. 31 Similar
changes have recently been enacted in Mexico. 38
The United States has shown a willingness to impose intellectual property
standards on developed as well as developing countries. The 1984
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act39 is an example of the former practice. It
limits American patent protection in the area of semiconductor designs to the
nationals of countries that provide similar protection to American nationals.
Although this provision could be challenged as a violation of the Paris
Convention guarantee of national treatment in Article 2(1), eighteen countries
have applied for and received reciprocal protection from the United States. 40
While it is not clear that semiconductor chip designs are a patent issue, the fact
that the United States is willing to apply trade leverage against developed as
well as developing countries in securing intellectual property protection is
significant. It demonstrates the degree to which the United States is prepared to
34

35

Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618.
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573.

36 The Generalized System of Preferences is a classification tool by which the American
government determines the duties to be applied against the products of other countries.
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act allows the executive to take action against "unfair"
trade practices of other countries by applying duties against their products. A good
overview of the evolution of American trade legislation can be found in Gadbaw, supra
note 18 at 229.
37 Each of these countries passed comprehensive legislation governing patents, copyrights
and trademarks. See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 229.
38 See the Ley de Fomento y Proteccion de la Propriedad industrial enacted June 26,
1991 as reported in G. A. Pemberton and M. Soni, Jr., "Mexico's 1991 Industrial
Property Law," (1992) 25 Cornell Int'! L. J. 103.
39 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620.
40 See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 236.
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violate existing international norms in pursuing domestic economic goals. As
will be shown later, the political capacity of the American government to act as
a "rogue elephant" in pursuing its goals may have much more weight in
determining whether or not an international patent system is established than any
philosophical or economic factors.
American power to apply punitive sanctions against countries with
"inadequate" patent systems was further strengthened in 1988 with the adoption
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. 41 The Act has two key
components with respect to intellectual property rights. The first is that it has
"inscribed the protection of intellectual property rights as one of the principle
priorities of United States trade policy." 42 The second is the strengthening of
section 301 by giving the United States Trade Representative the power to:
a) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of
trade agreement concessions ...
b) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods and
fees or restrictions on the services of, such foreign country ... or
c) enter into binding agreements with such foreign country ...
[to] eliminate the unfair act, policy or practice. 43
Thus, if the Trade Commissioner believes a country is failing to provide
adequate intellectual property protection to American companies or exporters,
she or he can take actions against such countries. 44 The shift in power to the
Trade Commissioner is significant in that the President loses full discretion over
decisions relating to the imposition of trade sanctions.
Conclusion
The Paris Convention's perceived failings are effectively summarized by
Ulrich Joos and Rainer Moufang in an address to the Max-Planck Society
Conference on Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition
Law. They state that:
Demands - triggered by the UNCTAD study dealing with the
role of the patent system in the transfer of technology - to
adapt the Convention to the specific needs of developing
countries were rejected, in particular by the U.S. standing in
the forefront of the countries that defended the status
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418.
See Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 223.
43 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, ?301, as am. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). [Taken from
Gadbaw, ibid. at 224.]
44 Hunnicutt provides an excellent overview of the 1988 Act. See supra note 33 at 301.
41

42
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quo .... This experience apparently led the U.S. to the
conclusion that an improvement of the [Paris Convention]
could not be achieved in the present context of the NorthSouth conflict. On the other hand, the U.S. share the opinion
that the existing intellectual property Conventions do not
guarantee any longer a sufficient protection corresponding to
the needs of inventors and authors and of the respective
national economies. Lack of enforcement provisions and of
dispute settlement procedures is criticized. 45
Thus, the Paris Convention is seen by a growing number of participants as either
too restrictive or not restrictive enough. Furthermore, the rift is increasingly
emerging outside the diplomatic realm through the American use of unilateral
trade sanctions to secure patent compliance from other countries.
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants 46 attempts to provide plant breeders protection for the development of
new plant varieties, 47 filling a gap left in the scope of the Paris Convention. 48
Applicants must apply to each of the member states separately for protection,
and they gain a minimum of 15 years protection for their plant variety if
successful. 49 In addition to the Paris Convention principles of national treatment
and right of priority, the Plant Variety Convention requires member states to
protect a minimum number of plant varieties under their national law before they
may join the convention. 50
Participation in the Convention has been limited to 19 developed nations, 51
however its significance extends beyond its immediate subject material. As it is
not administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, it
demonstrates a willingness of industrialized countries to act outside existing
multilateral cooperative mechanisms to promote minimum levels and scope of
patent protection. Agreements such as the Plant Variety Convention may form
the basis for a new international developed country patent system under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
45

F.K. Beier and G. Schricker, eds. GAIT or WIPO? New Ways in the International
Protection of Intellectual Property (Munich: IIC Studies, 1989) at 21.
46 The Convention is set out in Leaffer, supra note 9 at 55-75 [hereinafter Plant Variety
Convention].
47 Articles l and 2.
48 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 53.
49 Article 8.
50 Article 4.
51 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 54.
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Patent Cooperation Treaty

The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is the mosf e.xtensive agreement
concluded under the auspices of the Paris Convention. 52 The PCT greatly eases
the administration of multiple-nation patent applications by allowing the patent
seeker to make one application to the central organization (WIPO) which will
conduct a full search of the international state of the art. 53 The applicant can
select the countries to which they wish to apply for protection and the results of
the international search are then sent to each of the relevant member nations. 54
The international bureau then publishes the patent applications. 55
In addition to the state of the art review, the international bureau will also
do a preliminary examination to determine whether the invention appears to be
new, non-obvious, and industrially applicable if the applicant so requests. The
results of this review are not binding on member states.
While the organization provides a central registry and common applications
process, it does not circumvent domestic patent processes. Applicants are still
required to meet the relevant criteria for patent protection in each country
applied to, and to pay the relevant registration fees of those countries. As of the
beginning of 1990, 43 countries were party to the PCT with roughly half of the
members being developing countries. 56
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification

The Strasbourg Agreement Concerning International Patent Classification
was concluded in 1971 under the auspices of the Paris Convention. It is an
information-sharing and categorization agreement which divides the technology
that may be the subject of patents into 8 sections and 46,000 subdivisions. 57
Each classification is given a symbol that can be used in universal searches to
determine the prior art. While the agreement encourages the unification of
patent legislation, it only requires that member states utilize the classification
system as a primary or subsidiary means of classifying patent applications. 58

52

The treaty was concluded in Washington in June of 1970 and entered into force in

1978.

Articles 15-17 of the Treaty govern search procedures.
Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 21.
56 See Leaffer, supra note 9 at 77-78.
57 See generally Leaffer, supra note 9 at 531.
58 See Article 4(2).
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Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure
This 1977 treaty came into force in 1980 and endeavoured to ensure
common procedures for the disclosure of microorganism patents. 59 It sets up a
number of international depository authorities (IDA) which keep the deposited
sample organisms in storage. Deposit in a single IDA is deemed to meet the
requirements of deposit in all member states.60 As with the Plant Variety
Convention, membership in the Treaty has been limited to developed countries.

Treaty Patent System
The most sweeping proposals for change within the Paris Union came with
a WIPO conference in May 1984 that was initially designed only to deal with
questions of grace period harmonization. Ultimately, this meeting led to an
examination of broader areas of cooperation. 61 Representatives of 48 nations
have participated in this "Treaty Patent System" (TPS) round of negotiations and
preliminary positions have been established in five key areas: a common grace
period after public disclosure, application of the first-to-file principle,
transferability of patent applications, patent rights, and patent remedies. 62
The common grace period is an effort to address the problem of public
disclosure of an invention leading to its loss of novelty for the purposes of
making a patent application. Only a limited range of countries currently allow
inventors grace periods in the case of non-prejudicial disclosure of inventions. 63
Grace periods have been supported on three grounds: that many inventors are
unaware that disclosure will jeopardize patentability, that inventors often are
unaware that an invention is patentable until someone to whom they show it
draws this to their attention, and that inventors are often required to disclose
59

The Treaty is set out in Leaffer, supra note 9 at 127-140.
Article 3(l)(a).
61 K. M. Curesky, "International Patent Harmonization Through W.I.P.0.: An Analysis of
the U.S. Proposal to Adopt a "First-to-File" Patent System," (1989), 21 Law & Pol'y in
Int'! Bus. 289 at 292.
62 This material has been drawn from Curesky, ibid., and W.T. Fryer, "Patent Law
Harmonization Treaty Decision is Not Far Off- What Course Should the U.S. Take?: A
Review of the Current Situation and Alternatives Available," (1990), 30 Idea 309. The
commentary is on the 7th meeting of the group of experts on patent law harmonization
which shaped the August, 1991 draft Treaty.
63 An example of a non-prejudicial disclosure would be if an invention was stolen and its
details published. Currently, only the EEC, Japan, Canada, the United States, Belgium,
Australia, Japan, USSR and Brazil apply grace periods. See Curesky, supra note 61 at
298.
60
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their inventions in order to receive financial backing. The TPS would establish a
one-year common grace period for the non-prejudicial disclosure of inventions.
The second, and perhaps most surprising recommendation, is the universal
adoption of a first-to-file system. In March 1987, the United States delegation to
the TPS indicated that the American government was willing to consider the
adoption of a first-to-file system if it were part of a balanced treaty package. 64
This system is philosophically grounded in the notion that the first true inventor
should have sole claim to the invention. It allows the first true inventor (in fact)
to file for and successfully claim patent rights years after another (but later) true
inventor has filed for and received a patent. Consequently, it leaves patent
holders uncertain about their rights as other inventors might come forward at a
later date claiming they were the first true inventor. All other nations in the
world rely on a first-to-file system that awards the patent to the first true
inventor to file the application.
The next major item is the requirement that members accept applications
following the guidelines set out in the treaty. The acceptance of a common
patent application form, in combination with the provisions already in place
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, would allow inventors to submit one form
to a central office. The information contained on that form would be sufficient
to meet the patent information requirements of each country, eliminating the
inventor's need to tailor applications to each country.
The fourth area concerns the definition of the scope of patent rights. This
includes, for example, the level of scientific research utilizing patented
inventions that should be allowed prior to the expiry of the patent. While
agreement has not been reached on all factors determining what is to be
protected, a consensus appears to be developing on the doctrine of equivalents. 65
The United States currently utilizes a doctrine of equivalents to prevent the
copying of the essence of an invention. This contrasts with countries such as
Japan which allow the copying of the essence of an invention as long as there
are minor modifications. 66 The adoption of the doctrine of equivalents would
broaden the scope of existing patents, providing additional protection for
inventors.
On the most critical of patent rights, the duration of protection, consensus
also appears to have developed among the key industrialized countries. 67 The
Ibid. at 294. Since November 19, 1987 when Royal Assent was given to Bill C-22 in
Canada which changed the Canadian approach to a first-to-file system, the United States
and the Philippines have been the only two countries retaining a first-to-invent system.
65 Ibid. at 300.
66 Ibid. at 300.
67 Ibid. at 302.
64
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United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland all recommended the adoption of a twenty-year minimum
patent protection period at the Fourth Session of the TPS negotiations.
However, Brazil and Argentina, which lead the developing nations at the TPS
negotiations, argued that the goal of the TPS should be harmonization and not
uniformization. They contended that nations should be left to set their own
periods of protection in order to tailor their systems to local development needs.
The final area of discussion in the draft Treaty is the scope of exclusions
from patent protection. The United States, Switzerland, and Japan insisted that
any balanced package would have to place limitations on the products and
processes that could be excluded from patent protection. 68 Of particular interest
to the United States were guarantees that genetically engineered plant and
animal life, along with the processes for producing them, would be protected
against exclusion in national patent systems. The question of exclusions has
been the most controversial area in the TPS discussions. Developing countries
have argued vociferously for their right to exclude products where it is necessary
to support local economic or development interests and propose that there be no
restrictions on exclusions in the treaty. 69
The final area dealt with in the draft Treaty is the provision of remedies for
the violation of patent protection. While there is general agreement that
remedies should be provided, member states have been unable to agree on
compensation and damage standards.
The draft Treaty provides evidence that many nations are willing to discuss
patent harmonization, but agreement is likely to be limited to procedural issues
such as the transferability of patent application forms between countries.
William Duffey has observed that in the opinion of many in the legal
community, "even if an international harmonization treaty were to emerge from
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) within the next year or
two, few countries would ratify the treaty." 70
Regional Treaties

The most comprehensive examples of regional cooperation are the African
and Malagasy Industrial Property Office (OAMPl)71 and the Scandinavian Patent
68

Ibid. at 304.
Ibid. at 305.
70 W.H. Duffey, "Patent Harmonization Can Enhance the Global Competitiveness of
Canada and the United States," (1988), 14 Can.-U.S. L. J. 271.
71 Member states are the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Benin, Gabon, the Ivory
Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, the United Republic of Cameroon,
and Burkina Faso.
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Community (SPC). 72 In both systems, identical patent laws are in place in each
country with full transferability of patents among the member states. OAMPI
was launched in 1962 with the adoption of the Libreville Accord and has been a
financial, as well as a cooperative, success. Since 1964, fees generated from
applications have covered the operating costs of the organization. 73 The
Scandinavian Patent Community was established in 1964 and maintains national
patent offices for the application of a Nordic Patent Law. 74
Quickly approaching OAMPI and the SPC in comprehensiveness is the
European Economic Community (EEC). The current basis of EEC patent
cooperation is the European Patent Convention which was adopted in 1973 and
came into force in 1977. 75 The Convention establishes common rules for the
issuance of patents among member states but leaves enforcement to the national
levels of government. The Common Market Patent Convention, which is due to
enter into force on January 1, 1993, would take this cooperation even further by
establishing common enforcement mechanisms. 76

TheGATT
Since 1947, members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) have worked to reduce barriers to trade among its members. The
current negotiations of the GATT began in 1982 with a Ministerial Meeting in
Geneva that concluded there should be an examination of barriers to trade in the
service sector. The scope of the negotiations has gradually expanded, but four
contentious areas remain: agriculture, textile safeguards, services, and the
protection of intellectual property. 77
Under the current terms of the GA TT, Article XX( d) places adoption of
enforcement of necessary measures to secure "the protection of patents, trade
marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices" among the
general exceptions of the GATT. 78 Consequently, trade sanctions are not
permitted in attempting to secure compliance with intellectual property
standards. Thus, when Brazil challenged the decision of the United States to

Participating members are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at I 6-17.
W.S. Wolfeld, "International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step," (1983) 16 Cornell
Int'! L. J. 229 at 238-239.
75 Leaffer, supra note 9 at 141-42.
76 Ibid. at 142.
77 M. Kakabadse, "Current Status of the Uruguay Round," (1989) 19 Ga. J. Int'! & Comp.
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C.A.P. Braga, "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA TT: A View
From the South," (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'I L. 243 at 247.
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remove trade concessions on the basis of Brazil's failure to meet U.S.
intellectual property standards, Brazil was able to bring action against the
American government under the GATT. 79
Largely at the insistence of the United States, change was sought to Article
XX(d) which led to the adoption of what Braga has termed "a masterpiece of
diplomatic compromise."80 The negotiating basis for the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) states:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights and to ensure that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify
GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and
disciplines. 81

Although there would likely have been an American push to include patent
protection in the GATT in any event, the perceived futility of the Paris
Convention negotiations resulted in increased efforts to obtain reform through
the GATT process. As Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein notes:
It may be that this experience has led the United States to
believe that in the present political context of North-South
conflict, there is no possibility of agreement among the great
number of member states of the Paris Union on proposals to
further improve the system of the Paris Convention. This may
also be one of the reasons why the United States has proposed
to include intellectual property matters in the negotiations of
the so-called "Uruguay Round" of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).8 2

The United States has not been alone in its attempts to secure patent
protection under the GATT. In June 1988, a joint statement was issued by key
segments of the European, Japanese, and American business communities. 83 It
called for priority to be given to intellectual property protection in the Uruguay
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80
81

Gadbaw, supra note 18 at 231.
Braga, supra note 78 at 248.

Ministerial· Declaration of Punta Del Este, of September 20, I986, as quoted in Ibid. at
248.
82 Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 27 at 266-67.

The business communities are: in' Europe, the Union of Industrial and Employers'
Confederation of Europe; in Japan, the Keidanren; and in the United States, the
Intellectual Property Committee. See R.E. Berenbeim, Safeguarding Intellectual
Property (New York: The Conference Board, 1989) at 2.
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Round with the approval of a three-part code. The first was the assurance of
effective, equitable, and non-discriminatory enforcement of intellectual property
rights. The second was the establishment of dispute settlement procedures to
ensure domestic laws of GATT members include basic intellectual property
protection and enforcement mechanisms. The third was the granting of
preferential trade treatment for signatories to encourage adherence to intellectual
property standards. 84
Although the GATT approach represents a potential political abandonment
of the Paris Convention, it would not represent a legal violation of the
Convention as provision is made for the establishment of special agreements
under article 19. Kunz-Hallstein states, "we may therefore conclude that
member states of the Paris convention would not be hindered under this treaty in
seeking improvements of the international system of industrial property
protection within the framework of other international arrangements such as
GATT." 85 Thus, as long as the terms of the Paris Convention were met, such as
national treatment, there would be nothing stopping GATT members from
refusing to grant preferential trade status to countries refusing to meet specified
standards for the protection of intellectual property.
Conclusion

The Paris Convention was one of the first and most comprehensive
multilateral attempts at regulating state behaviour in international law. It has
also been one of the most successful in terms of meeting its goals. However, the
Paris Convention and related agreements are increasingly seen as inadequate by
both proponents and opponents of an international patent system.
Efforts by the developing world to alter the terms of the Paris Convention
under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development provide evidence of the developing world's dissatisfaction with
existing arrangements. Efforts by the United States and other developed
countries to cooperate outside the World Intellectual Property Organization
structure through agreements such as the Plant Variety Convention and, more
recently, through the GATT, demonstrate the danger of a collapse in the existing
system. Were the GA TT to permit trade discrimination on the basis of
"inadequate" patent protection, developing nations that are increasingly
orienting their economies to international markets would have little choice but to
comply with demands that a rigorous protection of patent rights be accepted.
Before accepting such a fate, it would be imperative that the philosophical and
84
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Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 27 at 271.
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economic arguments, which ground current assumptions about the benefits of an
international patent system, be analyzed.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
The first known patent statute containing what would now be regarded as having
the basic elements of patent protection was enacted by the City State of Venice
in 1472. 86 The Venetian statute outlined four key goals for the grant of patents. 87
They were general utility to society, encouragement of inventive activity, refund
of costs incurred by the inventor, and the inventor's rights to the fruits of his or
her mind. The Venetian goals have elements of both major philosophical
approaches to the granting of patents. These approaches may be classified as the
rights approach and the utilitarian approach to patent protection.
Rights Approach to Patent Protection

The rights approach to patent protection is rooted in the last of the Venetian
goals, that the inventor has the right to the fruits of her or his mind. The purest
form of this approach can be found in the preamble of the 1791 French patent
law: "Every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to
society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and it would be a violation of
the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention were not
regarded as the property of its creator." 88
The rights approach is grounded in a perceived imperative that the
individual owns that which they improve or create. Perhaps the best known
proponent of this approach is John Locke. Section V of Locke's Second
Treatise ofGovernment, 89 entitled "Of Property," outlines the basis of ownership
rights: "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use
the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were,
inclose it from the common."90 Although Locke did not consider the specific
issue of patents, the argument for patents can be made by analogy to his theory.
If inventions are seen as a mixing of physical resources with intellectual
capabilities (Locke's cultivation of land) and inventions are limited to areas not
86 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 32. Though this was the
first actual patent legislation, Ladas describes a system of trade marks in Ancient Greece
and Rome that could be seen as the rudimentary beginnings of an industrial property
system. (S.P. Ladas, The International Protection of Industrial Property (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1930) at 6-7.
87 United Nations, ibid. at 44.
88 Ibid.
89 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980).
90 Ibid. at 21.
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already deemed "state of the art" (the unenclosed land) then an individual is
entitled to protection for novel inventions.
While Locke's rights can be used to outline the effects of a right to patent
protection, the goal of this paper is to analyze the benefits of an international
patent system. Consequently, the various underlying justifications for the rights
approach must be examined in order to assess their validity. While there are a
number of ways to present the differing justifications for rights based systems, a
helpful division can be found through the use of a spectrum from natural law to
positivist conceptions of rights. Pure natural law justifications (such as Locke's)
ground their rights conceptions in reason while pure positivist rights schemes
base their rights on political legitimacy. Between these extremes are the
reciprocal rights schemes which utilize a combination of rationality and political
justifications. The underlying justifications of each of these four broad
categories will be examined to determine their legitimacy.
Rational external basis for right

Political external basis for right

<

>

Pure Natural Law

Full Reciprocal Rights

Tempered Reciprocal Rights

Pure Positivism

(e.g. Locke)

(e.g. Gewirth)

(e.g. Rawls)

(e.g. Kelsen)

Pure Natural Law Rights
Natural law conceptions of rights justify the existence of rights through
rationality. Margaret MacDonald notes that "[p]ropositions about natural law
and natural rights are not generalizations from experience nor deductions from
observed facts subsequently confirmed by experience. Yet they are not totally
disconnected from natural fact. For they are known as entailed by the intrinsic
or essential nature of man. Thus they are known by reason." 91
There are two major strands of natural law justifications for patents. The
first, which I term the moral imperative strand, rationally deduces that
individuals have a moral right to the product of their labours. As this right is not
grounded in economic qualifications, it would result in a patent system with
rights of unlimited duration (or at least for the lifetime of the inventor). This
moral right is seen as a trump to considerations such as the economic welfare of
others. Given the potentially dire and continuing consequences, both in terms of
crowding out future inventions and in monopolistic price gouging, this strand of
natural law has not been adopted in any country with respect to patents. No
patent system grants an unlimited duration of protection.
91

M. MacDonald "Natural Rights," in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (London:
Oxford University Press, 1984) at 25.
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The second strand of natural law patent justification, which I term the
economic imperative strand, argues that the awarding of patent protection to
individuals is rationally the most efficient means of securing economic
development. The classic proponent of this theory is John Locke whose
rationality is grounded in Christian conceptions of God granting the world to
Adam (the embodiment of humanity in common) "to make use of it to the best
advantage of life, and convenience." 92 Locke argues that the grant of land was
for industrial and rational use and that this use can best be secured through his
system of private property rights. 93 Thus, patent rights would be seen as a
rational right to the fruits of one's hands based on the fulfillment of God's desire
that the productivity of land be maximized through the encouragement of
industrious behaviour from individuals.
It is interesting to note that Locke places an important qualification on his
property rights doctrine. He argues that "nor was this appropriation of any
parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was
still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use." 94
Given the educational and technological advantages of industrialized states over
developing countries, it is difficult to argue that there is "enough, and as good
left," for them to invent. Thus the equity which Locke would claim in the
system would be lost.
While Locke's conception of rights is only one natural law approach, it
serves to highlight the two difficulties inherent in any justification relying on
natural law. The first is that the assumptions underlying the right are not
necessarily shared by individuals from differing socio-political backgrounds.
The second is that "rational" individuals can arrive at different results using the
same assumptions.
While many Christians may accept the assumption that the Earth was given
to men and women to use as they see fit, other cultures place a premium on
harmony with nature, not domination over it. 95 If maximizing productivity is not
the aim of society, the rational deduction that a patent system is necessary to
secure this production would be challenged. 96
Locke, supra note 89 at 18.
Ibid. at 18-30.
94 Ibid. at 21.
95 While traditionally tribal-based societies, including many of Canada's First Nations,
may be a visible example of this, the growing acceptance of sustainable development as
outlined by the Bruntland Commission provides evidence that Western industrialized
societies may be tempering their view of environmental domination.
9 6 For example, it may be more efficient to hunt with a gun than a boomerang, but the
invention of such a device in a tribal grouping need not be viewed as an "advance".
Ritualistic aspects of the traditional hunt may be critical to the social well-being of the
92

93

24

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Even if it is assumed that there is general acceptance of the maximization of
production principle, "rationality" need not dictate that patent rights be granted.
The rationality MacDonald highlights as common to all natural law conceptions
of rights is not a neutral mathematical standard that all would agree is correct.
For example, Marxist theory views differential rewards based on a measure of
talents as an inefficient way of maximizing wealth. 97 Consequently, natural law
conceptions of rights based on Marxism would rationally deduce that wealth
would be distributed according to needs and not talents. This was largely the
case in the People's Republic of China prior to the adoption of the new Patent
Law in 1984. 98 As patents systems are rooted in financially rewarding the
individuals who make the invention, they would be unacceptable given the
assumptions of natural law utilizing Marxist principles. 99
It may be argued that given the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and moves in
remaining Marxist countries such as China to accept incentive rewards, 100 the
rational argument for rights is becoming unified through an acceptance of the
right to the product of one's labour as the most efficient means to production.
The key to this argument is that rights-based private property systems (with
patents as a component of them) are more economically efficient than other
models. If it were shown that patents were not the most efficient system or that
the effects of such a system were economically ambiguous, this "rational"
argument would fall. Thus, current natural law justifications for patents (derived
from the second strand of natural law thinking) are rooted in reasoning about
economic efficiency. The statistical validity of this reasoning will be examined
in the economics section of the paper.

tribal group. Thus, inventions may be viewed as a backward step in social development.
See generally K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin,
1967) at 96-100 arguing for an egalitarian distribution of property and K. Marx, "Critique
of the Gotha Programme" in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings (London: Fontana, 1984),
particularly at 153-161 from which the quotation "From each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs!" was drawn.
98 Beaumont, supra note 3 at 45.
99 As with any interpretation of Marx, care must be taken in drawing conclusions. In the
Communist Manifesto, Marx states that "Do you mean [to abolish] the property of the
petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois
farm? There is no need to abolish that." (see supra footnote 97 at 96) Thus, Marxist
theory could allow a restricted use of rewards for inventions by "small" inventors. Still,
Marx's overriding concern is that individuals receive societal output according to needs,
thus any use of these patent-style rewards would be severely restricted.
100 See particularly articles 60 and 61 of the Chinese Patent Law (1984) which grants
foreign patent holders an exclusive right of exploitation and provides protection against
infringement. Reproduced in Kay, supra note 3 at 368-378.
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Full Reciprocal Rights
The next rights-based justification of patents can be found in full reciprocal
rights systems such as that of Gewirth. 101 Again, there are two elements of rightobtaining process: the assumption and the processing of the assumption.
Gewirth assumes that rights are to be granted where individuals would not want
others to be able to interfere with their scope of action in a particular area. In
general terms, the. assumption is processed by individual A demanding a right.
Individuals B, C, and D would have to ask: "Would I want others to be able to
control my actions in that area?" If the answer is no, a right is found.
In terms of patents, an individual might ask for the right to the products of
her or his labour, in this case, patent protection. If the others decided that they
would not want any individual to prevent them from getting the fruits of their
labour (protection for their inventions), then a right to patent protection would
be found.
The key criticism of this approach is that patent rights are not likely to be
granted in situations where society is not made up of individuals with equal
economic potential. If an individual knew that they did not have inventive
capabilities, they would be likely to reject the inventor's claims, arguing that
everyone should have immediate access to inventions.
Gewirth's argument can be transferred on a national level to current
disagreements between developing and developed countries over patent systems.
Developing countries lack the educational and technological infrastructure
necessary to compete with developed countries in many areas of invention.
Consequently they would be likely to argue that others should be able gain the
fruits of their citizens' inventive labour in the full knowledge that this loss
would be more than compensated for by the gain in free access to the fruits of
the inventors of the developed world.
Tempered Reciprocal Rights
John Rawls utilizes a veil of ignorance to attempt to avoid the problem that
knowing one's own economic status poses for Gewirth's system. 102 Rawls
argues that the test for economic distribution should be done behind a veil of
ignorance where individuals are unaware of their earning potential (or inventive
potential in the case of patents). He predicts that behind this veil, individuals
would rationally calculate that they might be the least well-off individual after
10 1 See A. Gewirth, "The Basis and Content of Human Rights," in Human Rights: Essays
on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),

especially the essay "The Basis and Content of Human Rights."
102 See generally J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (New York: Harvard, 1971) particularly at
152-157 on the maximin rule.
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the veil was lifted and would choose to maximize the minimum level of wealth
for each individual. This would result in an initially egalitarian distribution of
wealth. Rawls argues that this egalitarian distribution would only be departed
from where it could be shown that the transfer of additional income to one
individual would leave the least well-off individual in a better position - hence
my term tempered reciprocal rights.
In terms of the patent system, Rawls' approach would deny reward based on
invention unless it could be shown that in giving such an advantage to an
individual, the least well-off individuals in society would benefit. Thus, patents
could only be supported if the economic gains from such a system would leave
the poorest individuals in society better off. Again, we are left with a theory of
patents that relies on economic assumptions which will be dealt with in the
economic section.
Pure Positivist Rights
Pure positivist arguments for rights are easier to deal with as they rely solely
on legislative sanction for their justification. Rights to patents can be justified
wherever individuals vote for the establishment of a patent system.
The difficulty with this approach is that there is not universal agreement
among even elected developed country governments of the value of a patent
system. In June 1976, the Canadian Minister of Commerce and Corporate
Affairs, recommended the abolition of the patent system in 10 years if doubts
remained about its utility. 103 Among developing countries, elected governments
such as the Indian government have consistently rejected calls for the
establishment of a comprehensive international patent system. 104
Even if there were universal governmental agreement on the benefits of
patents, the result could be challenged on the grounds that governments are not
truly representative of all interests in their own society or even the interests of
the majority. As will be demonstrated in the Political Perspectives section, game
theory can be used to predict the predomination of groups with small but
concentrated economic gains over groups with wider but more dispersed
economic losses. 105 Positivist theory rests on the assumption that societally
103

Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note 19 at 3.
India is not a member of the Paris Convention and grants only limited protection to
foreign and domestic inventors. While a patent system is in place, it contains significant
limitations from the inventors' perspective including the automatic licensing of food,
medicines or chemical processes three years after the grant of a patent.
105 In brief, economic gains from the patent system are arguably concentrated in corporate
entities that rely on the system to maintain current profit levels. Given the central
importance of the system to these corporate entities, it is rational for them to lobby
104
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sanctioned agreements are "correct" agreements. Game theory predicts that a
patent system may be established in the face of the majority of society passively
opposing such a system with a concentrated minority actively lobbying in favour
of patent protection. Thus, deficiencies in the democratic process call into
question the validity of the positivist assumption that the agreed-to system is
truly the system most individuals favour or benefit from. Once again, the only
neutral standard against which to measure the patent system would appear to be
its economic impact.

Utilitarian Approach to Patent Protection
Utilitarian justifications for patents share a common focus on the perceived
economic benefits of the system. In broad terms, one commentator argues that
the purpose of patent laws, "like that of most civilized laws, is an ever-more
heightened, enjoyable and secure social existence." 106 This social existence is
secured on the assumption that inventions benefit society and that exclusivity is
the most efficient incentive to promote inventions. 107
While utilitarian justifications were present even in the City State of Venice
Patent Law, 108 it is only since the nineteenth century that they became the
paramount justification for patent systems. Evidence of the shift can be found in
the Austrian patent law adopted in 18 IO which stated "that inventors had neither
any property rights in their invention, nor any rights to patents." 10<> Patents were
justified only in terms of their contribution to economic development. The
rudimentary international patent system agreed to at the Vienna Conference of
government in an effort to maintain or strengthen the system. Even if the patent system
produced even greater economic losses in society generally, the losses would be spread
widely over consumers. Each individual consumer would be tempted to operate under
the "free rider principle," knowing that their contribution to any campaign to abolish
patents would likely have an insignificant effect. In other words, the "rational" consumer
will defect by refusing to contribute to a lobbying effort. The best case outcome for the
individual would be to have others contribute with the patent system being eliminated.
The worst outcome would be for them to contribute with others cheating, resulting in an
economic loss for them and no economic gain as there was insufficient lobbing to defeat
the patent system. Thus, it is in each individual's rational interest to "cheat," leaving no
consumer lobby and the corporate lobby dominant in determining whether there will be
patent protection.
106 G.R. Blakeney Jr., "Systems of Business Patents," (1990),30 Idea 355 at 355.
107 Oddi argues in "The International Patent System and Third World Development:
Reality or Myth?" [1987] Duke L.J. 831 at 837 that this argument has been largely
intuitive for much of the 500 years that modern patents have been in existence.
108 The first two of the Venetian goals (utility to society and the encouragement of
inventive activity) were clearly utilitarian. See United Nations, The role of the patent
system, supra note 5 at 44.
109
Ibid.
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1873 marked a key turning point as the justifications for patents focussed
exclusively on economic arguments. 110 Patents were supported at the conference
as a reward to inventors to give them an inducement to encourage inventive
activity and to disclose secrets.
While most countries with patent systems now focus their justifications on
utilitarian arguments, the United States has, at least until recently, 111 retained a
focus on rights-based justifications. 112 Evidence of this can be found in the
retention of the first-to-invent system which has as its aim the reward of the true
inventor, as opposed to the individual who first files for protection. Robert
Rines, President of the Franklin Pierce Law Centre, provides clear, if somewhat
bombastic, evidence that the individual rights approach in the United States is
alive and well. Arguing that the absolute novelty (or first-to-file) doctrine used
in most patent systems works against the American first-to-invent system, Rines
states:
It is not because the "absolute novelty" doctrine is at variance
with our American system that the author urges the world to,
at least, modify this doctrine. It is rather because this author
believes the American understanding of the needs of the
inventive process is an intellectually superior understanding ...
As in all areas where freedom and the rights of individuals are
to remain superior to the mere convenience of our
administrators, it is admittedly more difficult to administer the
American way or parts thereof. But that is the price of
everything worthwhile in attaining individual rights. 113

Utilitarian justifications for patents are all rooted in notions of economic

110

Ibid. at 44-45.
In March, 1987 the American delegation to the Third Session of the Committee of
Experts (set up to review patent cooperation under the World Intellectual Property
Organization) agreed to consider the adoption of a first-to-file registration system. This
would replace the first-to-invent system currently in force in the United States that is
philosophically grounded in the notion that the true inventor has a right to the fruits of
their invention. Caution should be used in interpreting this concession as a wholesale
change in philosophy as the American decision was partially rooted in an effort to obtain
reciprocal concessions from other nations. By making this concession, the U.S.
delegation hoped to convince other nations to widen the scope of patent protection to
include the patenting of living microorganisms.
112 The American support for the right of the inventor to protection has been relatively
recent.. Benjamin Franklin argued that "as we enjoy great Advantages from the
Inventions of others, we should be glad of an Opportunity to serve others by any
Invention of ours, and this we should do freely and generously." Quoted in R.E.
Berenbeim, supra, note 83 at 1.
113 R.H. Rines, "Some Areas of Basic Difference Between United States Patent Law and
That of the Rest of the World - and Why," (1987) 28 Idea 5 at 11.
111
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efficiency. While utilitarian theories may differ on whether the final goal is the
greatest good for the greatest number or the maximization of total economic
wealth, they all demand that the system adopted produce the most economically
efficient result in attaining the goal. Thus, support for any utilitarian theory of
patent protection would have to be grounded in findings that the patent system
was more efficient at producing its economic outcome than all alternative
systems - from no patents to government sponsored invention. Once again, we
are led to an economic analysis of patents as critical in justifying their existence.

Conclusion
Support for patent protection can be grounded in a range of theories on both
the rights and utilitarian spectrums. With the exception, however, of the moral
imperative natural law strand, all of these theories are grounded in an
assumption or reasoning that views patents as an economically efficient system.
Consequently, it is critical that the economic impact of patents be analyzed.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis

of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it
would be irresponsible on the basis of our present knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it. 114
Fritz Machlup, 1958
Although economic arguments have been critical in justifying the existence of
patent protection since the Venetian Patent Laws, 115 few resources have been
devoted to testing the validity of these claims. Economic arguments for and
against patents almost always consist of generalized allegations about categories
of costs and benefits and rarely endeavour to quantify these variables. Indeed,
the author has been unable to find any economic model that attempts to explain
patent protection in terms other than lists of costs and benefits. 116 Consequently,
n 4 Quoted in Oddi, supra note 107 at 841-42.
115 Recall that two of the four goals outlined in the Patent Statute of the City State of
Venice in 1474 were general utility to society and the encouragement of inventive
activity. See United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 44.
116 In all the literature reviewed by the author including a number of economic texts, not
one model for international patent protection was found. Carlos Braga (supra note 78)
has developed an equation for the net welfare effects of a patent system in a small,
developing country in which little invention takes place. However, the equation does not
go far beyond a list of potential costs and benefits and a conclusion that if the costs
exceed the benefits, a patent system should not be adopted. Braga notes that there is
virtually no economic data to quantify each of his variables.
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current economic analysis is limited to setting out potential costs and benefits of
patent protection and attempting to use comparative economic development
data, either between countries or at differing stages of a country's development,
to evaluate the magnitude of these costs and benefits.
The goal of the economic component of this paper is to determine whether it
is possible to move beyond Malchup's recommendation and calculate the net
economic cost or benefit of the establishment of an international patent system.
In order to accomplish that goal, the analysis will be built in three stages. First,
protection for an individual product in a closed economy will be assessed.
Second, protection for a range of products will be assessed in the context of an
open economy with all countries maintaining patent protection. Finally, the
cumulative costs and benefits from differing country types will be assessed in
determining the effect of global patent protection on total economic welfare.
In each case, an effort will be made to separate direct costs and benefits in
the adoption of a patent system from indirect effects - for example, the
utilization of monopoly power to force purchasers to sign contracts agreeing to
buy at the monopoly price beyond the life of the patent. Each of the indirect
costs will be evaluated to determine the degree to which they can and have been
mitigated through legislative sanction of such practices.

Single Product Patent
The first step in attempting to calculate the costs and benefits of an
international patent system is to isolate the results of the imposition of a patent
for a single product category (the sword) in a closed economy (Narnia). It is
assumed that the only source of inventive activity and production is from within
the country. It is further assumed that current inventiveness (sword
development) is below the socially optimal level. 117
Despite a number of efforts made by the author to develop such a model, all were
quickly rejected by other economics students with whom the model was discussed. The
inherent difficulty is that patent protection produces a host of potential influences on
economic development, some positive and some negative. Given that virtually none of
these influences have been quantified, it is difficult to begin to imagine what a graph
might look like plotting years of patent protection against economic development.
Developing such a model based on the current dearth of economic data is analogous to a
person trying to draw a road map to an unmarked city on the map. Even if we know the
city is on this continent and are constrained to existing roads (analogous to our
generalized knowledge of potential economic costs and benefits) the chances of drawing
a correct routing are small based on our current level of information.
117 The socially optimal level is a subject of considerably controversy. As was noted in
footnotes 97 and 98, it may differ greatly depending on the economic assumptions of
various cultures. Even under a liberalized market, agreement does not exist as to what
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Economic Benefits 11 S
Sabatier sets out the general benefits of providing patent protection as
follows:
En matiere d'invention, Ia societe est au plus haut point
interessee. Elle protege l'inventeur afin de stimuler le progres
technique et de satisfaire ainsi aux besoins de ses membres.
Elle s'efforce d'activer le developpement de l'economie dans
le sens d'une production plus abondante a meilleur prix de
revient, pour fabriquer davantage de biens repondant mieux a
ses besoins. 119
Sabatier's perceived increase in economic development is achieved through an
increase in inventive activity that produces longer term economic development
in the form of more efficient products. The increased inventive activity is
achieved through two mechanisms: increased investment in inventive activity
and increased knowledge.
The increased investment in inventive activity [Variable A] is a response to
a guarantee of economic reward for successful inventions during the period of
patent protection. This causes both human and capital resources to shift to the
relatively higher rewards being offered by the inventive sector. The increased
level of invention is presumed to be needed because the market fails to produce
the socially optimal level of inventions. Without protection for inventions, it is
argued that insufficient resources will be invested in inventions. Williamson
argues that "[t]he problem is that no one would have an incentive to invest in
making inventions which could immediately be copied by everyone since the
imitator would compete the price of the original down to a point that would
deprive the inventor of any profits to compensate him for his costs of making the
invention." 120 Thus, it is contended that insufficient resources will be devoted to
Narnian sword research by the private sector because the government refuses to
guarantee patent protection.
In assessing the benefits of a patent system to investment in inventions, it
the optimal rate of invention is. Economists such as Edith Penrose argue that a patent
system may encourage too much invention in the sense that resources are drawn away
from more productive sectors of the economy. Thus, it is possible that the socially
optimal level of invention will be produced without resort to government incentives such
as the establishment of a patent system. See E. Penrose, The Economics of the
International Patent System (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1951), at 35-36.
118 For a summary of all variables and equations utilized, see Appendix I.
119 M. Sabatier, L'Exploitation des brevets d'invention et l'interet d'ordre economique
(Paris: Centre d'Etudes Internationales de la Propriete Industrielle, 1976) at 2.
120 J. Williamson, The Open Economy and the World Economy (New York: Basic Books,
1983), at 280.
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must be noted that not all inventiveness is the result of economic reward.
Technological innovation did not begin with the development of the Venetian
Patent Law in 1472. 121 Clearly invention would not cease if sword innovations
were not granted patent protection in Narnia. In the modern setting, invention
may be more reward-responsive than in Narnia, but given the importance of the
corporation in determining where resources are focussed, it must be recognized
that a significant factor in invention is the gratification obtained in the
development of a useful product. 122 Thus, a certain level of invention would be
attained without the need to introduce a patent system [Variable B].
The second benefit, increased knowledge [Variable C], is a function of the
publication of detailed information about the invention, which might otherwise
remain secret, in order to secure the patent. This information can be used to
generate further inventive activity. Thus, by releasing the details of the new
sword alloy, other Narnian inventors could more efficiently engage in further
sword research.
This benefit is also mitigated by the fact that, even under a patent system,
the best option for the inventor would be to keep the technology secret and
maintain a monopoly of unlimited duration [Variable D]. Thus, if an inventor
were able to keep an invention secret while selling it, they would not apply for a
patent. Edith Penrose notes:
There is no way of determining whether or to what extent
patents prevent the loss of new inventions and ideas to society
because the inventors would otherwise carry their secrets to
the grave. It is difficult to see why an inventor would go to the
trouble of taking out a patent if the danger of imitation or of
independent discovery of the same invention were slight. 123
As a result, the economic activity from knowledge that would have been
available in the absence of the patent system must be subtracted from the

121

The levels of innovation and technological advancement during the Chow dynasty in
China or the rule of Sesostris III in Egypt were as successful as any modern period at
producing technological innovation. Yet, there is no evidence of monopoly grants in any
of these societies. Indeed, even in modern times, the explosion in scientific knowledge
and technological innovation in Renaissance Italy was not the result government
guarantees of monopoly profits but of a higher pursuit of knowledge. Thus, it is possible
that technological advancement is not primarily a function of economic reward but of the
establishment of a culture conducive to the quest for knowledge.
122 This can be extended to the corporation in certain instances as evidenced by the
decision of Bavarian Motor Works not to enforce their patents for structural safety
designs in the interests of allowing all car-makers to produce safer cars. [Information
drawn from B.M.W. commercials on television and in the print media during 1992.]
123 E. Penrose supra, note 117 at 34.

INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGIME

33

economic activity generated from knowledge under a patent system, in order to
produce the net benefit.

Economic Costs 124
The economic costs of patent protection can be broken down into two
categories: procedural costs and monopoly costs. Procedural costs [Variable E]
stem from the need to set up a system for judging whether the sword variations
were significant enough to merit patent protection and from the legal costs of
making, defending, and hearing claims of patent violations in a court system.
Direct monopoly costs take three forms. The first is the underutilization of
inventions [Variable F] that would have been available without the monopoly
premium if there were no patent system. Assuming that the Narnian
administrators could not separate out inventions that are the consequence of the
patent system, sword inventors that otherwise would have made advances and
been unable to charge monopoly prices for their swords are now able to do so.
The second monopoly cost is the devotion of research expenditures to "inventing
around" existing patents [Variable G]. Rather than building on existing
knowledge, inventive efforts may be channelled toward duplicating existing
inventions with different technology. The third potential monopoly cost is the
overallocation of resources in applied research as compared with basic research
[Variable H]. Given that it is only the useful applications of technology that are
patented, this will shift resources away from the basic research sector. 125 It is
possible, however, that the total level of basic research will actually be higher
under the patent system than without it, given the general reward incentives
offered by a patent system.
While there are a number of other indirect costs associated with the
patenting of a product, these are not the direct result of a monopoly system and
may be mitigated by legislative action. The first of these indirect costs is the
setting of the monopoly price well above even the monopolist profit maximizing
level. The most extreme example of this practice is non-use [Variable I].
Leading sword makers may hold patents to a number of sword variations that
they do not release as they would compete with an existing line of swords.
124 I have relied heavily on the analysis of Samuel Oddi in developing a list of potential
costs. See supra note 107 at 840-41. Again, for a summary of the variables and
equations utilized, see Appendix.
125 This may not hurt a country like Japan that historically imported basic research from
centres such as Germany and the United States. However, in our Narnia model, no such
research may be imported. Consequently there will be an overall monopoly cost in the
form of an underallocation in basic research that would otherwise have generated
economic activity.
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Thus, society would be denied direct economic benefits from these patents.
Non-use and price gouging, however, may be regulated through the
establishment of compulsory licensing schemes or the revocation of patents that
are not worked within a certain period of time. 126
The second indirect cost is contractual agreements to extend monopoly
power beyond the immediate scope of patent protection [Variable J]. Using
their monopoly power, patent holders have attempted to extend protection
periods beyond the scope of the patent, to limit use of patented items to a
particular sector, to force the granting back of technological innovations gained
in using the patented item, and to agree not to contest the validity of the
patent. 127 The Narnian government, however, would be free to enact legislation
preventing the use of such practices as a number of nations have done. 12s
In deciding what level of patent protection to accord swords, Narnia should
set the number of years of patent protection at the level where the total benefits
[TB= (A-B) + (C-D)] exceeds the total costs [TC= (E+F+G+H) + (I+J)] by the
greatest amount. If benefits never exceed costs, patent protection should not be
granted. Given the relatively different time periods needed to recover
investments for different products, it would be probable that the optimum
number of years of protection would differ from product to product. 129

126 Compulsory licensing is a provision that forces patent holders to negotiate reasonable
licence fees for users of their patented technology. Revocation is the overturning of a
patent, here on the grounds of non-use of the patent. The Paris Convention allows the use
of compulsory licensing and revocation though it insists that at least four years pass from
the filing date for the patent to the issuance of a compulsory licence. Section 83 of the
Indian Patents Act (1970) is an example of a national provision for revocation or
compulsory licensing. It provides that "patents are granted to encourage inventions and
to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest
extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay." Fifty-five nations maintained
provisions for compulsory licences in the case of a failure to work the patent in a United
Nations survey conducted in 1975 (see supra note 5 at 12.) Other measures for dealing
with non-use include licences of right, which may be imposed provided non-use is
shown, and automatic lapsing provisions, which provide that a patent will automatically
lapse after a specified period of time unless evidence of patent use is provided.
127 For example, the makers of Nutrasweet attempted to force purchasers of their product
to agree to continue buying the product at monopoly prices after the expiry of the patent
in return for immediate use of the product. Examples of other abuses of patent
monopolies are chronicled in the United Nations Report on The role of the patent system,
supra note 5.
128 The United States has legal sanctions against all the practices described. For a more
complete list of legislative responses to the abuse of patent monopolies, see ibid. at 21-

23.
129 Estimates for the time needed to recover research costs for a new pharmaceutical
product range up to fifteen years. See generally T.G. Field Jr., "Pharmaceuticals and
Intellectual Property: Meeting Needs Throughout the World," (1990) 31 Idea 3. Thus, a
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Even if Narnia concludes it is operating at below the optimal level of
innovation for a given product, it should be noted that patent protection is not
the only option available to the government to increase the level of innovation.
Dasgupta and Stoneman 130 suggest two other ways in which the socially optimal
level of innovation could be met. The first would be the direct government
production of knowledge with the knowledge being distributed free to all. The
second would be the use of subsidies to encourage the private production of
knowledge. In practice, most industrialized countries use both of these methods
as a supplement to the patent system. Another possibility is described by Ulf
Anderfelt in his classic work International Patent Legislation and Developing
Countries. 131 Anderfelt makes reference to Alexander Hamilton's proposal of
federal rewards paid to inventors for useful discoveries with the inventions then
being available to all. 132 This system continues to be utilized in China for
Chinese nationals. 133 Thus, in theory, it would be possible to generate any
desired level of invention through the use of non-patent mechanisms.

Single Country Patent System
When moving to the analysis of a patent system imposed over a range of
products in an open economy, two key variables change. The first is that the
total cost/total benefit equation is no longer maximized for each individual
product [Variable K]. While some countries maintain broad categories with
different levels of patent protection, 134 current economic knowledge would not
allow an accurate assessment to be made of the costs and benefits of each
specific item in determining its appropriate patent protection period. Thus, some
products would be overprotected by a common patent protection period and
others would be underprotected. This would create economic losses in the form
of misallocation of inventive resources.
The second variable is the possible import and export of patented goods,
investment, and knowledge in the open economy [Variable L]. Given the
socially optimal level of patent protection in a closed economy such as Narnia for a given
level of pharmaceutical innovation may be considerably higher than the socially optimal
level for sword protection due to the relatively longer development period for
pharmaceuticals.
130 P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman quoted in Braga, supra, note 78 at 254.
l3I U. Anderfelt, International Patent Legislation and Developing Countries (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971).
132 Ibid. at 62-63.
133 See Kay supra note 3, at 337-38.
1 4
3 For example, India maintains a different period of patent protection for food and
medicines than for other products. Egypt maintains different patent protection period for
chemical processes than other products.
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differing resource endowments of each country including "inventive"
intellectual resources, it is important to analyze the impact of a patent system on
different types of countries. The patent product exporting, neutral, and
importing countries will be examined in turn. Patent exporting countries are
those that are strong exporters of inventive technology. Patent neutral countries
are those that export and import inventive goods but have an equal balance of
trade on these goods. Patent importing countries are those that import inventive
goods into their economy.
Patent Product Exporter
An intellectual property exporting country such as the United States would
obtain additional gains in four forms. The first would be revenues from the
export of their intellectual property products to other countries which now have
protection. The second would be increased activity in the inventive sector
creating technological advances as a response to the guaranteed access to
markets larger than the home market. This would represent an addition to
variable A in the closed economy as it becomes more lucrative to invest in the
invention sector given the larger market [Variable Awl· The third benefit would
be gains in knowledge from patent information around the wodd. This
represents an increase in the magnitude of variable C in the closed economy
[Variable Cw]. The final gain comes as a result of the fact that even patent
exporters import some goods, consequently they would have access to inventive
technology otherwise unavailable in the closed economy and would generate
additional economic activity.
Against these gains are a potential outflow of investment in the open
economy. Large patent exporting countries like the United States and Germany
are usually exporters of capital for inventive operations in the form of branch
plants conducting research and development in other countries [Variable M].
This net outflow of investment need not represent a cost to the patent exporting
country. Presumably the primary reason for investment is the higher rate of
return obtainable in other countries. Thus, assuming profits can be repatriated,
the exporting country need not be left worse off.
Patent Product Neutral
The patent neutral country would have an equilibrium between patent
exports and imports that leave the trade gains from patents neutral. The country
would experience, however, the three other gains available to the patent
exporting country, gains in the form of increased internal investment,
knowledge, and direct technology access.
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Another potential gain to the patent product neutral country would be
external investment in the patent sector that would not be available in a closed
economy. This external investment would generate additional economic activity
in the patent neutral country. In theory, it would be possible that external
in vestment would be attracted even in the absence of patent protection, given
that ability to export to countries with patent protection. In practice,
multinational corporations, which are the critical players in these investment
decisions, are reluctant to invest in countries without "adequate" levels of patent
protection. 135
It should be noted that the impact of this additional investment is not
entirely positive. Assuming that profits could be repatriated by the country
which invested the capital, the patent neutral country would see an outflow of
funds in the form of dividend profit payments from research conducted in the
patent neutral country [Variable N].
Patent Product Importer
The patent importer has an outflow of funds exactly equal to the inflow to
patent product exporters in the form of resources devoted to purchasing the
inventive technology. The patent importer, however, receives gains in three
forms: increased inventive activity, increased knowledge, and direct access to
technology which produces economic gains [Variable 0]. 136 The first two of
these gains are likely to be extremely small in the importing country since as a
large importer of patents, it is at a comparative disadvantage in the development
of inventive goods. 137
As with the patent neutral country, there are potential gains from external
investment in the inventive sector of the patent importing country. Again, this
For example, investment in research and development in the Canadian pharmaceutical
industry has increased since the introduction of stronger patent legislation [PMAC Fact
Sheet No. 3, 1991]. Whether this increased investment will be sustained when the
agreement between the multinational pharmaceutical companies and the federal
government runs out remains to be seen.
13 6 Michael Gadbaw and Timothy Richards engage in a brief discussion of how these
variables might be measured in their study of intellectual property rights in Argentina,
Brazil, India, Mexico, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. However, they do not attempt to
estimate the value of these variables. See Intellectual Property Rights: Global
Consensus, Global Conflict? (Boulder: Westview, 1988) at 97-102.
137 A comparative disadvantage exists for country A when other countries have a
relatively higher endowment in inventive resources than country A. Thus, while there
may be an increase in knowledge and a potential for increased invention given access to
the global market, a country like Burkina Faso would be unable to take advantage of
these factors given their relative poverty in inventive resources in terms of the
development of products that would be internationally competitive.
135
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gain is likely to be small if the importing country lacks the educational
infrastructure to support such investment. Furthermore, this gain must be
balanced against an outflow of dividend profits reaped from the external
investment in the inventive sector.
The total gains and losses are summarized below with a breakdown of the
impact of these costs and benefits for each of the three classes of countries.

Patent Exporting Country
Patent Neutral Country
Patent Importing Country

Total Benefits

Total Costs

(A-B) + (C-D) (L+N+O) +
(Aw+Cw)
(A-B) + (C-D) + (M+O) +
(Aw+Cw)
(A-B) + (C-D) + (M+O) +
(Aw+Cw)

(E+F+G+H) + (I+J) 138+ (K+M)
(E+F+G+H) + (l+J) + (K+N)
(E+F+G+H) + (I+J) + (K+L+N)

Global Patent System

When calculating the cumulative effects of the costs and benefits of
individual countries in a global patent system, one reduction in costs and one
additional cost emerges. The reduction in costs comes in the form of a lessening
of the individual administrative costs (Variable E) of each country through the
adoption of a common patent system. 139 The additional cost is the misallocation
of inventive activity with the acceptance of a common patent protection period.
This misallocation is the global equivalent of variable Kon the domestic level. 140
Just as the setting of a common period within a country overprotects some
products and underprotects others, the establishment of a global period would
create similar costs as differing countries have differing optimal levels of
protection assuming different relative allocations of inventive resources.
When calculating the overall equation for global patent protection with a
common period of protection, the variables L, M, and N disappear as they are
equal and offsetting as they represent direct transfers from one country to
another. These variables, however, will be evaluated as it may be argued that
even if global welfare is maximized by the adoption of a patent system, it could
not be recommended if losses were concentrated in a particular class of countries
and the gainers were unwilling to subsidize those losses. Consequently, we are
left with the following equations: 141
Recall that in all cases, the (I+J) costs are potentially mitigable through legislation.
E. will be used to represent economic gains in administration and reduced litigation
from the establishment of common patent rules.
14 K. represents global costs of misallocation of inventive resources from the adoption of
a common protection period.
141 Where is the sum of the variables of all countries and (I, + 1) are mitigable through
l3S
139

°
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Total Global Benefits =(A1- B 1) + (C 1-Di) + (01) + (Aw1+ Cw 1)
Total Global Costs = (E1- Ew) + (F1+ G1+ H1) + (I1+ 11) + (K1) + (Kw)
Transfers =
M 1, and N1 = 0
While this model is no doubt incomplete, it is useful to attempt to break
down the potential costs and benefits of a global patent system in order to place
some order on existing economic data. No comprehensive economic assessment
has been made of the costs and benefits of the system. 142 Consequently, it is
necessary to assess the sparse economic data available for the assessment of
each of these variables to determine whether an assessment can be made as to
the merits of such a system.

Evaluating the Variables 143
Total Benefits

Variables Ar, Br, C1 , andDr

It is a sad commentary on the state of current economic knowledge that the
domestic variables A through D have not been comprehensively evaluated in
any country for which the author has been able to find information. The
challenge made by then Commerce and Corporate Affairs Minister Bryce
MacKasey in June 1976 that the patent system be abolished in Canada if further
studies confirmed doubts about its economic utility has not been answered. 144 In
short, no detailed econometric analysis has been done which separates the
additional domestic investment and knowledge produced by a patent system that
otherwise would have already been present in the economy.
Variable Or
In evaluating the direct technology gains from access to patents (variable
0 1), some work has been done in developing countries in an attempt to measure

legislation.
142 The closest we have to this would be the seminal 1951 work of E. Penrose, The
Economic of the International Patent System (see supra note 117). However, Penrose
focuses on the costs and benefits of such a system to the developing countries and makes
no effort to quantify these variables. She simply states her opinion that the magnitude of
the cost variables would be relatively high and the magnitude of the benefit variables
would be relatively low.
143 The reader may wish to refer to the Appendix which contains a list of all the variables
for ease of reference.
144
See Committee on Transfer of Technology, supra note I 9 at 3.
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the difference in development patterns between countries with strong patent
protection and countries with weak patent protection. The most comprehensive
study was undertaken by Arman Kirim of the patent-free pharmaceutical
industry in Turkey .145 Kirim states, "it can convincingly be argued that abolition
has not had a 'negative technology flow' impact." 146 In fact, Kirim found that
foreign pharmaceuticals were often introduced faster into the Turkish market
than elsewhere given less stringent testing requirements in Turkey. While
Kirim's study is comprehensive, it focusses exclusively on only one type of
product. Consequently, it is difficult to draw analogies to an entire system of
patent protection.
A broader, though far less thorough, study is the 1981 United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development Report, Examination of the Economic,
Commercial and Developmental Aspects of Industrial Property in the Transfer
of Technology to Developing Countries. 147 The study reviewed the experience of
developing countries that significantly weakened their patent laws, largely in
response to the 1975 United Nations Report that found the patent system was not
working in their interest. 148 The study suggests that "the drop in foreign patent
applications has not been accompanied by a decrease in imported technology to
these countries. Trends in transfer of technology agreements (Argentina and
India) or direct foreign investment (Columbia, India, and Mexico) suggest that
foreign technology has continued to flow into these countries." 149 While
technology may have continued to flow into these countries, the study does not
provide a list of similarly-situated countries that maintained a patent system and
their levels of technology transfer. Thus, we can conclude that technology
transfer is not entirely the product of a patent system, but are unable to calculate
the degree to which patent protection promotes such transfer.
Two additional points must be made in examining the value of variable Ot.
The first is the existence of rigidities in the technology market that might restrict
the flow of technology even with the adoption of a patent system (thus reducing
the overall value of Ot). The second is the impact on the total supply of
Since 1961, Turkey has refused to accord patent protection. to the pharmaceutical
industry.
146 A.S. Kirim, "Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the
Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry," (1985) 13 World Development 219 at 229.
147 UNCTAD, Examination of the Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects of
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Industrial Property in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries. Review of
Recent Trends in Patents in Developing Countries, UNCTAD, 1981, UN Doc.
TD/B/C.6/AC.5 [hereinafter Economic, Commercial and Development Aspects].
148 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5.
149 UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Development Aspects, supra footnote 147 at
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technology if one country acts as a free rider in refusing to adopt a patent system
while utilizing the technology produced by countries with patent systems in
place.
On the first point, the United Nations Report on The Role of the Patent
System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries found that
imperfections in the technology market were perhaps the most important factor
in the limited utilization of existing technical knowledge in developing
countries. 150 Theoretically, these rigidities could be corrected., however, if they
were not then the value of variable Ot might be very low as the existence of a
patent system would not be key in determining whether access could be obtained
to this technology.
The second point is based on the flawed argument that, "[m]oreover, no
matter what the cost of [technological] development, its use by others does not
diminish the supply of technology to its originator or to anybody else." This
point is strictly true. If a single country were to abolish its patent system, it
would still be able to review the patent information of all the other countries
(given the requirement that patent information be published) and copy this
information in producing goods. This would not diminish the supply of existing
technology. What is in the individual interest of one country, however, is not
necessarily in the interests of all. If all countries were to rely on the publication
of technological information from the patent systems of other countries, there
would be no such information. The "cheating" pattern that appears to work in
the interests of a single country falls apart if all try to act in the same manner.
Furthermore, the "pirating" of technology from other countries will not
reduce the existing base of technological development, but it could reduce future
development. Variables Awt and Cwt would be reduced for every country that
pulled out of a patent system. Thus, in making an overall assessment of variable
ot, we find that patents may not be critical in determining technology flows, but
that to the extent that technology flows are patent-related, global costs would
result from the pirating of technology.
Variables Aw1 and Cwr
The value of increased economic activity resulting from higher levels of
internal investment (Awt) and greater access to knowledge (Cwt) as a result of
guaranteed access to a global patent market also lack hard economic data.
Supporters of an international patent system like Richard Brennan, President of
the International Anticounterfeiting Coalition, argue that "adequate and effective
150

United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 31.
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intellectual property rights protection is fundamental both to competitiveness
and to increased economic development around the world." 151 No study of
which the author is aware, however, examines the extent to which guaranteed
access to foreign markets factors into investment decisions of companies in
invention exporting countries. Similarly, it is difficult to calculate the global
benefits of the common knowledge bank that would be the result of an
international patent system.
Opponents of an international patent system have also made broad
generalizations without providing data to support their claims. Edith Penrose
argues that the "incentive effect on foreign industry of a monopoly in one
additional market would usually be negligible." 152 However, as has already been
pointed out, the Penrose argument is flawed in that it fails to consider the effect
of multiple country defections from the patent system of global inventiveness.
Thus, while the impact on global research of the defection of Mongolia may be
slight, the cumulative impact of the defection of the entire developing world
would likely be significant. 153
Total Costs

Variables E1 and Ew
Variables Et and Ew are quantifiable, though the author was unable to find
an estimate of the value of these variables. Administration costs can be broken
down into the direct operating costs of individual patent offices and the
deadweight loss to the economy of the activities of lawyers in making
applications and litigating patent protection. While the direct administration
costs of a patent office are relatively small, 154 the costs of legal support for
applications and post application litigation is considerably larger. The
application costs of filing a patent in a single country are generally under $200
151 R. M. Brennan, "Intellectual Property Aspects of Canada-U.S. Competitiveness in the
World Context," (1988) Can.-U.S. L.J. 263.
152 Penrose, supra note 117 at 113.
153 It can be argued that the free transfer of technological information to the developing
world might be an appropriate form of foreign aid to foster economic development.
Thus, using a cycle theory of patents, countries would gradually strengthen their patent
structures as they became economically more developed. This pattern of gradual
strengthening in response to economic development occurred in both the United States
and Japan. For a discussion of the Japanese experience, see C. Mackley, "The Role of the
Patent System in Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience," (1987) 26 Col. J.
Transnat' 1L. 131.
154 The World Intellectual Property Organization administered the terms of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (which includes the preliminary determination of patentability of an
invention) for about 18 million Swiss francs (about $15 million Canadian) in addition to
the nominal fees for the processing of individual applications.
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American. 155 One author has estimated, however, that the full legal costs of
filing the necessary five patents to protect a single product in ten countries at
$50,000 U.S. 156 This does not take into consideration the litigation costs
associated with defending and challenging patents.
These costs would be significantly reduced through the establishment of a
common patent system (variable Ew). Lawyers would only be able to charge for
their knowledge of one set of patent laws - the global standard. Furthermore,
only one application would be required rather than the existing system of one
per country. 157 Post-application litigation costs could also be reduced as
challenges could only be made under the international patent system, and not
under a range of national patent laws. While the value of Et minus Ew is not
insignificant, it would represent a considerable advance over current costs of Et·
Both, however, represent a cost when compared against the option of no patent
system at all.

Variables F1 , G, and H,
As with variables At through Dt, it is disappointing that so little research has
been done into the economic costs of the underutilization of inventions
otherwise available, research devoted to "inventing around" and overallocation
resources to applied research. Given the lack of hard economic data, it is
difficult to assess the basis on which both proponents and opponents of an
international patent system claim such a system would be either of huge
economic benefit or a disaster.

Variables 11 and11
Although these variables are mitigable with appropriate legislative action,
they are perceived to be among the greatest costs of the establishment of a patent
system. Criticisms of price gouging and non-use (variable 11) and of contractual
abuses of monopoly powers (variable J1) are at the heart of many of the critiques

155 See United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 60 for a full, if
somewhat dated, fee listing.
156 Blair, quoted in Field, supra note 129 at 22.
157 Although the Patent Cooperation Treaty allows application to a central body, this is
only the first stage in the patent process. Applications must then be pursued in each of
the countries in which the applicant desires protection and are evaluated independently in
each of those countries according to national law. The exceptions to the one application
per country rule would be the European Economic Community, the Scandinavian Patent
Union and the African and Malagasy Industrial Property Office for which one application
is sufficient for all member countries.
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of the existing patent structure and its impact on developing countries.158 In
attempting to assess the importance of these variables, it is also essential that the
degree to which they are a function of the patent system and the degree to which
they are mitigable are also examined.
Price gouging and non-use (variable I1) are particularly visible and have
been the focus of much of the criticism of existing patent structures. 159 The
effects of price gouging are not limited to developing countries. In 1973, the
British Monopolies Commission found that the British subsidiary of Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann-La Roche AG was paying $925 U.S. per
kilogram for the active ingredient in Librium and Valium which could be
purchased in Italy for $22.50 US per kilogram. 160 On the issue of non-use, the
United Nations found that 81 percent of American patents in Mexico and 94.5
percent of Japanese patents in that country were not worked. 161 In an earlier
1974 study, the United Nations found that the products of between 90 and 95
percent of patents in developing countries were not used in those countries. 162
The inference is made from statistics such as these that the reason the patents are
not worked is the fact that many of them are taken out to prevent competing
products from being introduced in the market. Thus, the country is denied both
the benefits of the new technology and still must pay the monopoly price.
Both the price gouging and non-use arguments assume that, in the absence
of a patent system, such practices would not occur, or would be significantly
reduced. Kirim's findings in Turkey, however, call these conclusions into
question. 163 Kirim found that in the patent-free Turkish pharmaceutical industry,
the imported price of selected raw materials sampled ranged from 274 percent of
the world price to 3586 percent of the world price. In a similar sample of
imported active ingredients, prices ranged from 171 percent of the world price to
25,416 percent of the world price. Thus, price gouging may be primarily a
function of the oligopolistic nature of the inventive industry as well as rigidities
in the international market, and not a product of the patent system.
Kirim came to similar conclusions with respect to non-use. All
pharmaceuticals in Turkey must obtain a product licence. Of the 20,000 product

158 See for example Anderfelt, supra note 131 c. 2, 3.
159 For example, Vaitsos has focussed his criticism of the patent system in the
pharmaceutical sector on price gouging and related monopolistic practices. See "Patents
Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries." (1972-73) 9 Journal of Development
Studies 71.

160 The example is taken from United Nations, The role of the patent supra note 5 at 58.
161 UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 22.
162 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 42.
163 See Kirim, supra note 146 at 221-226.
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licences that had been taken out, Kirim found only 1482 or 7.41 percent were
actually being marketed. This figure is well within the range of non-use of
patents in Mexico. 164 Thus, it appears that non-use is not primarily a function of
the presence or absence of a patent system.
With respect to variable Jt (contractual abuses of monopoly powers) it has
been argued that the granting of a patent provides the holder with monopolistic
leverage to extend the patent beyond the formal terms of patent protection.
Examples of such contractual abuses include agreements to extend monopoly
prices beyond the legislative period of protection, to limit the use of patented
items to a particular sector, to force the granting back of technological
innovations gained in using the patented item, and to agree not to contest the
validity of the patent.
Again, it is possible that many of these potential costs are the consequence
of oligopolistic power that may be present in an industry and not the existence of
a patent system. Kirim found that "even when licensing agreements are not
based on patents, as in the case of the Turkish pharmaceutical industry, all of
these restrictive conditions can still be included in the contracts." 165 Similar
practices have been utilized in American contracts with Indian importers. 166
This is because of the oligopolistic power of the American companies that
allows them to set the terms of trade with their Indian counterpart. Thus, it is the
oligopolistic power and not the patent system that would have to be challenged
if contractual abuses of monopoly power are to be avoided.
Consequently, patents may be a relatively small component of the overall
power base of oligopolistic industries. In the 1970s, the United Nations
Commission on Trade and Development - dominated by developing countries saw patents as the key element of monopoly power in developing countries. By
1982 the patent was seen as playing a relatively secondary role in monopoly
power. In their 1982 Guidelines on Technology Issues in the Pharmaceutical
Sector in the Developing Countries, the United Nations Commission on Trade
and Development concluded that:
Trade marks have become a source of market power in the
pharmaceutical industry, perhaps of greater importance than
patents .... Trade names, i.e. the name identifying the enterprise,
although less important than trade marks in the marketing
policies of the pharmaceutical companies, also play an
important role in sales promotion. The reputation of certain
companies has been an additional factor in securing the loyalty
164
l65
166

UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 22.
Kirim, supra note 146 at 229.
United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 20.
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of the medical profession .... Once the brand name is
established, competitors entering the market after the expiry of
the patent period find it difficult to compete successfully with
the established brand, even if they offer the product at sharply
reduced prices. 167
By 1988, a United Nations Conference entitled Technology Policies for
Development and Selected Issues for Action failed to make any significant
reference to the patent system in technology policies. Instead, the conference
focus was on the establishment of free trade zones and other methods of
attracting foreign investment. 168
Overarching any discussion of price gouging, non-use, and contractual
abuses of monopoly power is the realization that all of these abuses may be dealt
with through legislation. They are not a direct function of the patent system.
For example, article 16 of the Zambian Industrial Development Act restricts
contractual monopoly power in that "[a] contract for the transfer of technology
and expertise shall not contain any condition: ... (e) Which restricts the volume or
structure of production; [or] (f) Which limits the ways in which any patent or
other know-how may be used." 169 In short, while these abuses often have severe
economic consequences for developed and developing countries, they are not a
direct consequence of the imposition of a patent system and cannot be counted
as costs in determining whether or not to establish a global patent system. 170
Variables K1 and Kw
Given the scarcity of econometric analysis of the optimal period of patent
protection, it should not be surprising that it is not possible to calculate either the
misallocation costs of a common protection period for each country or of the
adoption of a global patent protection period. Assuming such econometric tools
167 UNCTAD, Guidelines on technology issues in the pharmaceutical sector in the
developing countries (New York: United Nations, 1982) at 10.
168 UNCTAD, Technology Policies for Development and Selected Issues for Action
UNCTAD, 1988 UN Doc. TD!fT49 at 10.
169 UNCTAD, Control of restrictive practices in transfer of technology transactions:
Selected principal regulations, policy guidelines and case law at the national and
regional levels UNCTAD, 1988 UN Doc. TD!fT94 at 9.
170 It is assumed that the international patent system would not prevent member states
from taking such actions. The Paris Convention as currently constituted does place one
significant limitation on revocation and compulsory licensing in the face of non-use.
Articles 5(A)(2), 5(A)(3), and 5(A)(4) require members to wait at least four years from
the application for the patent before taking such action. One possible balancing provision
in the adoption of an international patent system might be the modification of these
articles to allow the immediate suspension of patent rights where there is evidence that
the patent holder is acting outside the provisions of the patent grant.

INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGIME

47

were to become available, it may be possible to fine tune an international patent
system with different protection periods for different products. On the basis of
current economic knowledge, however, neither these costs nor the fine tuning of
an international system could be accomplished.
One note should be made about the likely level of protection for an
international system. It has been assumed in the Treaty Patent System and
GATT negotiations that the protection period would be in the range of 15 to 20
years. 171 Assuming all countries participated in the common patent system, it
would seem logical that a shorter period of protection be adopted. Given
guaranteed access to greater numbers of people, the number of years required to
recover research investments would presumably decline. By adopting the 15 to
20 year range, there would be an implicit assumption that the current level of
global invention is too low and that guaranteed market access is required to
increase that level of invention. As Penrose has noted, this assumption is open
to debate. 172
Transfer Implications
Although the net impact of transfer costs on global welfare are, by
definition, zero, consideration should be given to their distributional
consequences in order to identify whether there are any major gainers or losers
from the establishment of an international patent system.

Variable L
The calculation of the flows of patented goods is made easier by the
existence of data on the nationality of patents around the world. A 1975 United
Nations study helps to demonstrate the sharp split in patent ownership:
An overwhelming majority (84 percent) of the patents in
developing countries is owned by foreigners, mainly
multinational corporations of five developed market-economy
countries .... The nationals of developing countries hold in their
own countries no more than 1 percent of the world stock of
patents, and in other countries, no more than about two thirds
of 1 percent of foreign-owned patents. These countries have
plainly been on the periphery of the patent system. 173

17 1 See The Historical Perspective Chapter for a more complete discussion of these
negotiations.
172 Penrose, supra note 117 at 128.
173 United Nations, The role of the patent system, supra note 5 at 42.

48

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

The mere fact that a country or group of countries has a comparative advantage
in producing a particular type of goods is not necessarily evidence of a problem.
Canada is almost wholly reliant on Morocco and Spain for its production of
clementines. Developing countries are gaining a growing hold on the world's
textile markets. Dependence on foreign technology, however, is often seen in a
different light than dependence on other goods.
Among relatively developed countries such as Canada, there is a fear that
unless they maintain competitiveness in the technological sectors, they will be
consigned to acting as providers of unprocessed and semi-processed resources.
This view is buttressed by economic theories about the existence of a learning
curve in technological industries. 174 It is argued that by investing in
technological industries a critical mass of technological innovation can be
generated. Once generated, this mass feeds on experience gained to make
further technological advances that foster more research; the country begins
"riding the curve" without the introduction of additional resources in the
technological sector. Thus, if it were determined that the maintenance of a
strong domestic technological sector was key to the maintenance of quality jobs,
there would likely be objection to the imposition of a global patent system that
would favour economies that are currently innovation-intensive.
Variable M

The significance of investment that flows as a consequence of patent
protection has been questioned by a number of economists. Penrose argues that
"the evidence does seem to support the proposition that in by far the greater
number of cases the willingness of a country to grant patents on inventions
already patented and worked abroad is of no great importance one way or
another as an inducement or obstacle to foreign investment." 175 Penrose's view
is supported by a 1981 United Nations study that examined the effects of the
weakening of patent legislation in a number of developing countries in the early
1970s. The study found that compound annual investment rates were
comparable in the pre and post reform periods. 176 The study, however, does not
compare the growth rates of these countries with similarly situated states that
maintained strong patent regimes. Thus, while there is some doubt about the

174 American economist Michael Porter of is one of the current proponents of this theory.
See, for example, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990).
175 E. Penrose "International patenting and the less-developed countries" (1973) 83 The
Economic Journal 768 at 775.
176 See UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at
14-20.

INTERNATIONAL PATENT REGIME

49

investment benefits resulting from patent protection, there is insufficient
economic data to make a firm judgement about the magnitude of investment
flows and their responsiveness to the strength of a national patent system.

Variable N
The calculation of the flow of dividends resulting from patent-related
investment suffers from the same problems of measurement as the calculation of
investment flows. While it is possible to calculate the value of dividend profit
flows from each country, the extent to which these flows would be present in the
absence of a patent system has not been calculated. Consequently, no clear
assessment can be made of the value of these flows.
Conclusion
Given the lack of economic data available to calculate the value of virtually
all of the variables set out in the equation, only three relatively weak conclusions
may be drawn. The first is that general evidence suggests that the patent system
is not as important in determining levels of economic development as was once
thought. International market rigidities and the presence of oligopolistic
industries may serve to dampen any benefits or costs from the adoption of an
international patent system.
The second conclusion is that among the variables for which there is data,
there is some evidence that they may not be as significant as the proponents and
opponents of the system proclaim. Thus, the benefits and losses may both be
smaller than originally assumed by the two opposing camps.
The final, and overriding conclusion, is that there is insufficient economic
data on each of the individual variables to make any firm conclusion about the
fostering or abandonment of efforts to establish a global patent system with a
universal patent. Thus, we have not really moved beyond Malchup's statement
in 1958 that we have insufficient data to recommend for or against the
establishment of a patent system. This view has been supported by two recent
studies in the field. In 1985, Arman Kirim noted in his study of the Turkish
pharmaceutical industry that "notwithstanding criticisms of the system, the
actual economic implications of patents is still an unresolved issue because the
existing empirical work on the subject is not yet sufficient." 177 In 1989, Carlos
Braga came to a similar conclusion in finding that "[t]here is no a priori strong
evidence that [developing] countries will necessarily benefit or lose from a

177

Kirim, supra note 146 at 219.
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reform of their intellectual property systems." 178 While the examination of each
of the costs and benefits has cast doubt as to the magnitude of both the costs and
benefits often alleged by proponents and opponents of an international patent
system, the current level of economic knowledge is far from the point where it
would be possible to make even an educated guess as to whether the benefits of
such a system would outweigh the losses.
While there is insufficient economic data to make a recommendation on the
establishment of an international patent system, it has been noted that many
countries have altered their intellectual property laws in response to their stage
of economic development. Damschroder has observed that early intellectual
property protection in the United States was limited to works authored by
American citizens and was expanded only gradually over the next 100 years. 179
A similar pattern of evolution in protection has been observed in Japan by
Mackley. He notes that "[t]he Japanese patent system has evolved at times to
comply with changing needs of the economy." 180 While there may be no
economic data to justify such evolving standards, the fact that two of the largest
inventive nations once restricted patent protection would give cause for
developing nations to argue that they should also be allowed to gradually evolve
their protection.
If such a strategy were to be adapted to an international patent system, it
might establish a universal patent but allow individual countries to alter their
period of protection according to their stage of economic development. Thus,
countries with more developed economies would be expected to subsidize less
developed countries through free access to the inventive knowledge and related
technologies. As these countries became more developed, they would be
expected to improve their patent protection to feed the general pool of
knowledge.
Having failed to find an economic justification for or against patent
protection, political explanations will be examined in an effort to explain the
existence of different phases of development in domestic patent systems. The
same political factors will be analyzed in an effort to determine if it is likely the
world is moving to the development of an international patent system.

1s Braga, supra note 78 at 264.
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M. L. Damschroder, "Intellectual Property Rights and the GATI: United States Goals
in the Uruguay Round," (1988) 21 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 367 at 373-375.
180 Mackley, supra note 153 at 164.
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POLITICAL FACTORS
Given the inadequacy in both the current scope of intellectual property
protection worldwide and in the outlook for reform either through bilateral
negotiations or through international intellectual property bodies, the new
GATI round provides a most logical and promising vehicle for change. 181
Kenneth W. Dam (IBM Vice President,
Law and External Relations)
While the philosophical and economic sections have failed to provide a
normative explanation for the existence of an international patent system,
political game theory 182 may provide a positive explanation for why domestic
patent systems strengthen with economic development and whether it is likely
that these same pressures will produce an international patent system. Three
stages of development will be examined in an attempt to formulate a general
model: a weak innovation national economy, a strong innovation national
economy, and an international economy containing both weak and strong
innovation states.

Weak Innovation Economy

In the weak innovation economy it is assumed that most technology is
imported or copied and produced domestically and that industrial interests in the
innovation sector of the economy are relatively weak. At such a stage of
development, game theory would predict that a patent system would not likely
be developed. Economic interests are concentrated in sectors that rely on
technology generated from other intellectual property systems. These sectors
are reluctant to pay monopoly premiums for access to the technology or
information on which it is based. Consequently, it is in their collective interests
to set up a lobby to convince the government to maintain the existing regime of
no patent protection. This lobbying behaviour was observed in the
pharmaceutical industries in France until 1958, Germany until 1968, and Japan
until 1976. 183 These industries relied largely on externally generated technology
181 K. W. Dam, "The Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual
Property," (1987), 21 The Int'! Law. 627 at 636.
182 Game theory was developed by economists such as 1986 Nobel Prize winner James
Buchanan as a method of assessing the economic behaviour of "rational" actors in
predicting overall economic development. More recently, it has been expanded to the
political realm in an attempt to explain political decisions in terms of "rational" voters
interests and to predict future decisions. An excellent introduction to the political
dimension of game theory can be found in Iain McLean's Public Choice (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1987).
183 These are the years in which pharmaceutical patent protection was introduced. See
UNCTAD, Economic, Commercial and Developmental Aspects, supra note 147 at 29.
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to generate their profits, and so, lobbied strongly to protect the source of those
profits - the absence of a patent regime.
Against these relatively concentrated industrial interests are the interests of
a weak innovation sector. Some domestic companies may develop their own
inventive products or make significant modifications to imported inventive
technology. It would be in their economic interests to have a patent system
which would protect their innovation in the form of monopoly access to the
market with their technology. These interests, however, are relatively weak in
comparison with the technology pirating and using industries. Consequently,
lobbying of the government is unlikely to pose a significant challenge to the
status quo of a patent-free economy.
Application of the game theory model in the weak innovation economy has
been summarized by Braga as follows:
Those who have a vested interest in avoiding the reform [of
the patent system] would tend to lobby forcefully against
enhanced intellectual property rights protection. The potential
beneficiaries, in turn, would tend to be much less organized
and prone to adopt a free-rider attitude in the policy debate.
As a result, the political support for such a reform may not be
sufficiently strong to override the opposition. 184
Thus, game theory predicts that in the low-innovation economy, the noninnovation interests will win the political debate and no patent system will be
introduced.
Strong Innovation Economy

In the strong innovation economy, the number of innovation industries has
grown (as they did in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry over the late 1960s
and early 1970s) to the point where they are a relatively important component of
the economy. Given the potential gain to these industries of the establishment of
a patent system, it would be in their rational economic interests to band together
and fund a lobbying effort to convince the government to introduce such a
system. More specifically, the gains to each innovating company would be
relatively high. Consequently, it would be in their interests to contribute to a
general industry campaign to obtain a patent system as the potential rewards
would be large for each individual company.
Allied against this move might be the relatively weak pirating sector and the
consumer lobby. Given the relatively diverse and often disorganized nature of

184

Braga, supra note 78 at 262.
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the pirating industries, their lobby would be unlikely to match the strength of the
innovation industry lobby. While it may appear that the strongest lobby of all
would be the consumer lobby, game theory predicts that even if consumers were
united in their opposition to the perceived higher prices of a patent system, they
would not likely be successful. The potential losses to each individual consumer
in the form of monopoly prices are relatively small. Consequently, while they
might prefer to see a campaign funded to prevent such a system from being
established, it would not be in their rational interest to contribute to such a
campaign, given the relatively minor benefit they would deri:ve from it. If each
individual consumer arrives at this same decision - to act as a free-rider - then
the consumer lobby will be severely underfunded or not funded at all. Thus,
game theory would predict that patent systems would be developed more often
than not in countries with relatively concentrated innovation sectors, even where
the majority of the population would oppose the development of such a system.
International Patent System
When moving to the international system, a key pressure that is added is the
potential lobbying of other governments. This lobbying has two avenues of
impact. The first is directly on the government that is making a decision on
whether or not to have a patent system or the strength thereof. The second is on
industries that perceive the foreign government as willing to utilize trade
sanctions that might hurt those industries and that, in turn, lobby their
governments to establish a patent regime.
Evidence of the importance of this international pressure can be found in the
decision of Korea to strengthen its intellectual property legislation in response to
American trade threats. In November 1985, the United States Trade
Representative initiated an investigation of Korea's lack of intellectual property
rights. The Korean government, backed by industry that was fearful of
generalized American trade sanctions, quickly agreed to establish a
comprehensive intellectual property system in an agreement with the American
President in July 1986. 185 Thus, for those countries that are susceptible to the
trade leverage of innovation intensive economies, it is likely that they will be
pressured into accepting changes in their intellectual property rights. 186
185 See S. R. Phillips, "The New Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988: Trade Wars or Open Markets?" (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 491 at 576.
!86 Further examples of this trend can be found in the recent decisions of Taiwan,
Singapore, Mexico and Brazil to significantly improve their intellectual property systems
(including the patent component of them). The decision of Brazil is particularly
important given its traditional role as one of the leaders of the weak patent movement in
the developing world. Hunnicutt notes that Turkey has also given indications of a
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Although individual countries may be pressured to establish patent rights,
this would not leave us with a unified international patent system. Game theory,
however, can also be used in predicting a probable outcome of the current push
by developed countries to establish such a system in the GATT negotiations.

The GATT and the Establishment of a Global Patent System
As was outlined in the historical background section, the United States and
other leading innovation-intensive economies 187 appear to be abandoning
existing international intellectual property forums such as WIP0 188 in an effort
to attain the goal of an intellectual property system that would include an
international patent. This shift is consistent with the American view that
inadequate patent protection is not a justifiable exercise of domestic policy
determination but a conscious barrier to trade that must be eliminated.
The choice of the GA TT forum is not random. Its use is a conscious
abandonment by the United States of the existing mechanisms controlled by the
World Intellectual Property Organization. Rather than bargain in a forum where
the United States has little support and even less leverage, the American
government has chosen to push for an international patent system in an
organization where they remain the dominant player. American decisions on
whether to open their markets to developing countries will be critical to
determining those countries' levels of development in the post-Marxist, free
enterprise world. Consequently, these countries will be reluctant to risk losing
favoured trade status by opposing American pressures for the establishment of
an international patent system.
As has already been noted, leading countries within the anti-international
patent bloc such as Mexico have already altered their systems in response to
American pressure. In the face of more generalized pressure by other leading
innovation exporters, it seems probable that agreement will be reached on the
establishment of an international patent system under the GATT.
Conclusion

Although game theory cannot provide a normative explanation of whether

willingness to modify their intellectual property systems in the pursuit of trade benefits.
See supra, note 33 at 305.
187 See supra note 83 and related text.
!88 Kunz-Hallstein has argued that the combination of a strengthened WIPO and the right
of reprisal under customary international law could be used in the development of an
international patent system within existing WIPO structural mechanisms. See supra note
27.
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or not to establish an international patent system, it does provide a positive
theory that predicts the establishment of such a system. The collapse of the
alternate Marxist economic system has left developing countries even more
susceptible to the pressures of innovation-intensive economies. Consequently,
we are likely to see the establishment of an international patent regime under the
auspices of the GA TT.

CONCLUSION
The deliberate adoption of this economic policy [an international patent
system] can be justified on economic grounds only if the gains that accrue
to society from it exceed the costs incurred because of it. It is indeed
awkward that the costs cannot be measured nor the gains counted. As a
result the optimal limits on the patent system, whether with respect to
time, space, patentability or restrictions on the use of the grant, must
always remain a subject of controversy.1s9
Edith Penrose
When acting in the role of legal practitioner, lawyers have a responsibility to
engage in positive interpretations of existing law. In recommending the
establishment of a new system of rules, however, the lawyer must move beyond
positive law and include normative considerations that set out the philosophical,
economic, and political bases of the law. Given the major stresses felt by the
existing international patent mechanisms under the Paris Convention, a new
legal structure is likely to be created. Thus, in determining the form of this new
structure, it is critical that lawyers recommend a system of rules that reflects the
interests of the community it is to serve.
An examination of the philosophical justifications of an international patent
system reveals two possible strands of thought. The first is a moral imperative
of patent rights that would dictate patents of unlimited duration in order to meet
the inventor's natural rights to the fruits of their labour. Given that no patent
system in the world has accepted unlimited rights, it appears that moral
imperative thinking is not deemed to be in the interests of any of the
communities the international patent law would be serving. All remaining
philosophical justifications for patents are rooted in assumptions about the
economic efficiency of such a system. Thus, lawyers must examine the validity
of these economic justifications.
Unfortunately, as Penrose notes, most of the variables are impossible to
quantify on the basis of current economic knowledge. Thus, any justification or
opposition to an international patent system is fundamentally flawed in that it is
189 Penrose, supra note 117 at 225.
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grounded in insufficient economic data. Rather than pressing ahead with GATT
negotiations on the length of priority periods, the scope of patent protection or
the criteria for non-use, the legal community should be encouraging further
research into the underpinnings of an international patent system so that it would
be possible to make an attempt at determining whether such a system would be
in the economic interests of the community it serves. Unlike many legal debates
that are grounded in fundamental and arguably irreconcilable philosophical
differences, most major players agree on the economic terms of the patent
debate. Without further study to evaluate those terms, it would be irresponsible
to recommend for or against the development of an international patent system.
Unfortunately, international political events are overtaking rational
calculations of whether an international patent system would serve the interests
of the global community. Given the relatively concentrated gains accruing to
innovation-intensive corporations, leading industrial countries have mounted a
concerted campaign to enshrine intellectual property rights, including patent
rights, in the Uruguay round of the GATT. Given the collapse of the Soviet
Union and corresponding inability of developing nations to turn for assistance to
institutions other than the market-oriented International Monetary Fund, they
will have little choice but to conform to the wishes of the industrial powers or
face possible exclusion from GATT trade preferences.
This is not to conclude that the establishment of such a system will
necessarily have a detrimental impact on developing nations. Indeed, it is
possible that they will obtain considerable long-term benefits from participation
in an international patent system. Laws should not be recommended, however,
on the basis of blind possibilities. Their impact on the various sectors of the
community they serve should be carefully measured. On the basis of our
existing knowledge, we cannot make such a measurement. Consequently, it
would be unconscionable to pressure countries to modify their patent regimes to
an international standard. Until a normative basis for an international patent
system is found, Alice's White Knight should be left to invent on his own and
should not expect international patent protection.
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APPENDIX- Variables Utilized
A

= Economic activities from

investment (human and capital) in inventions
under a patent system
B = Economic activities from investment (human and capital) in inventions that
are not based on economic rewards
C = Economic activity derived from knowledge available under a patent system
D =Economic activity derived from knowledge that would be present
regardless of the patent system
Total Benefits (TB) =(A-B) + (C-D).
E = Administration costs
Direct ("legitimate" consequences of monopoly power)
F =Underutilization of inventions otherwise available
G =Research expenditures devoted to "Inventing around"
H =Overallocation in applied research
Indirect (mitigable consequence of abuse of monopoly power)
I= Non-use
J=Contractual abuse of monopoly power
Total Costs (TC)= (E+F+G+H) + (I+J) *

* Apply only where there is no legislation to prevent them
K = Misallocation of inventive resources due to a common patent protection
period
L = Net flow of patented goods
M =Net flow of investment in patent research
N =Net flow of dividends
0 =Direct technology gains from increased access to patents
Aw=Economic activities from internal investment in inventions given access to a
global market
Cw=Advances made as a result to access to knowledge obtained from patent
information around the world
Total Global Benefits: (A1-B 1)+(C1-D1)+(0 1)+(Aw1+Cw 1)
Total Global Costs: (E 1-Ew)+(F1+G1+Hi)+(I 1+J 1)+(K 1)+(Kw)

Where 1 is the sum of the variables of all the countries and (! 1+11) are mitigable through
legislation.

